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RUSSIA & LEGAL HARMONIZATION: AN
HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO IP REFORM AS
GLOBAL CONVERGENCE AND RESISTANCE
BORIS N. MAMLYUK*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines several waves of intellectual property (1P)
regulation reform in Russia, starting with an examination into early Soviet
attempts to regulate intellectual property. Historical analysis is useful to
illustrate areas of theoretical convergence, divergence, and tension
between state ideology, positive law, and "law in action. " The relevance
of these tensions for post-Soviet legal reform may appear tenuous.
However, insofar as IP enforcement has emerged as one of the largest
hurdles for Russia's prolonged accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), these historical precedents may help explain Russia's apparent
theoretical and political disconnect from the WTO. If Russian
policymakers and many Western analysts agree that Russia has complied
with all necessary structural adjustment reforms for WTO accession
(including reforming its IP legislation), then deeper points of contention
between Russia and the West must be identified. One point of departure,
the Article posits, is Russia's lingering inability to convey adherence to
general international law.
Thus, this Article re-conceptualizes the link between domestic and
international legal orders by connecting the IP debate to broader debates
over the nature of international law in the Soviet and post-Soviet space.
Specifically, Part I examines how Soviet theorists attempted to reconcile
IP regulation with Marxist ideology and socialist international law. Part
II surveys the main IP law reform projects in post-Soviet Russia from 1992
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to 2006, with particular emphasis on harmonization with global legal
standards. The second part also provides a brief comparative analysis of
Russia's latest IP law (effective 2008) and copyright protections in US.
law as well as the 1971 Berne Convention. The Article concludes with an
overview of doctrinal debates within Russia over harmonization, WTO
accession, and international law. These debates shed light on the
development of local resistance to further legal harmonization efforts, an
issue of immediate relevance not just for policymakers working with
Russia, but for broader law and development debates.
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has Russia finally ended
its transition and completed its restoration/reintegration into the
international legal order? If so, has Russia developed a novel theory of
international law or has it fully subscribed to the liberal international legal
model? In his 2003 introduction to the second edition of G.I. Tunkin's
Theory of International Law, William E. Butler, the eminent legal scholar
of Soviet/Russian law, noted that "[t]here is no 'substitute' or
'replacement' theory, as yet, to supersede the insights into international
RUSSIAN IP REFORM
behaviour identified by Academician G.I. Tunkin."' Taking as granted that
Russia has not fully adopted a liberal theory of state and law along
Western lines, as most observers had hoped, it is worthwhile to reexamine
the countless continuities and discontinuities between the Soviet and post-
Soviet Russian experience with international law and institutions.
Considering Russia's increasingly aggressive foreign policy posture and
growing uncertainty over the viability of domestic reforms, it is vitally
important to take stock of these difficult-and largely unquantifiable-
aspects of Russian reforms, from the enduring legacy of great
power/socialist/bureaucratic thinking still prevalent among Russia's policy
and academic elites, to more concrete issues like Russia's attempt to
project respect for property rights to potential investors.
The present Article explores these historical breaks and continuities in
the context of Russia's intellectual property reforms.3 The analysis follows
two parts. Part I offers a brief legal history of Soviet regulation of
intellectual property ("IP") rights, starting in the early 1920s when the
Soviet state was first engineering its socialist legal system in an apparent
attempt to break away from the global "bourgeois" legal order. The first
Part also provides an overview of the "mature" or classic Soviet IP regime.
Part II presents a synopsis of IP law reform projects in post-Soviet Russia
and Russia's attempts to harmonize its IP legislation with international
norms throughout the 1990s. Part II also compares Russia's subsequent IP
law reforms to U.S. copyright law, particularly in reference to legal
licenses or "fair use," through a traditional functionalist comparative law
methodology.4 The Article concludes with a broader discussion on the
effectiveness of Russia's attempts to harmonize its domestic IP system
with international norms, including a study of resistance. This in turn
allows an evaluation of alternative policy options or alternative normative
1. William E. Butler, Introduction to G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW xiii
(William E. Butler trans., 2d ed. 2003).
2. See Dmitri Trenin, Russia Reborn: Reimagining Moscow's Foreign Policy, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 64; see also Boris N. Mamlyuk, Book Review, 35 REV. CENT. & E. EUR.
L. 111 (2010) (reviewing INTERNATIONAL LAW A RUSSIAN INTRODUCTION (Valerti I. Kuznetsov,
Bakhtiar R. Tuzmukhamedov eds., 2009)).
3. This Article is Chapter 6 of a larger dissertation on the development of international legal
theory in Russia during two moments of crisis, the Interwar period (1919 1939) and the post-Soviet
period (1989 2009).
4. Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES:
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 104 08 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003); Mary Ann
Glendon, Michael W. Gordon & Christopher Osakwe, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 11 12 (2d
ed. West 1994). On functionalism more broadly, see the classic Robert K. Merton, SOCIAL THEORY
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 73 (1968 Enlarged Edition).
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approaches to law reform and law and development projects not just in
Russia, but in other transitioning states.
I. EARLY SOVIET IP PROTECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. Why Turn So Far to History?
Most historical studies looking at IP reform in post-Soviet Russia start
with the classic or late Soviet period (1960-1989) as a point of departure.5
This is a useful starting place. However, the early Soviet period-the
interwar years of 1919-1939Ioffers a remarkably sophisticated
complementary analytical frame for considering the inner tensions and
incongruities of Soviet legal theory and practice. How the Soviet Union
came to recognize IP rights despite openly professing to oppose "private
property" (and any laws that upheld the right of ownership to the means of
production) may shed further light on the ambiguous intellectual structures
of Soviet law, and by legacy, the post-Soviet legal system.
B. Lenin as IP Regulator-in-Chief?
A core tenet of Marxism and Leninism was the abolition of private
property over the means of production and a critique of property forms
generally.6 As such, it may come as a surprise that the early Soviet state
protected IP rights. Yet the early Soviet state was an ardent defender of
individual and commercial right holders' claims both foreign and
domestic, and not merely under the New Economic Policy which briefly
liberalized the Soviet economy from 1922 to 1929. Lenin himself issued
no less than a half dozen decrees on copyright and authors' rights
protections between 1917 and 1922. What explains this apparent paradox?
Did not the very notion of owning an idea or a work of art contradict the
socialist conception of mass production and commonality of title? The
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
xv (4th revised ed. 2005). The notable exception in this regard is Michiel Elst's comprehensive
historical study. See MICHIEL ELST, COPYRIGHT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND CULTURAL POLICY IN THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Martinus Nijhoff 2005); see also SERGE L. LEVITSKY, COPYRIGHT,
DEFAMATION, AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET CIVIL LAW: DE LEGE LATA Ac FERENDA (1979). Elst and
Levitsky, however, do not connect the history of IP regulation in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia
with broader debates in Soviet/pre-Soviet international legal theory and practice, which is the goal of
the present analysis.
6. See generally RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY (1945); EVGENY PASHUKANIS,
LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY (Barbara Einhom trans., Inklinks 1978); HANS KELSEN,
THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW ch. 5 (1955); HUGH W. BABB, SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1951);
WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LEGAL THEORY (1996).
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answer to this question goes to the heart of the early Soviet theory of state
and law and invokes fundamental theoretical debates that rocked the
Soviet legal establishment throughout the interwar period. A quick survey
of these debates is useful to contextualize the discussion that follows.
One reason for the eruption of fierce debates regarding the nature and
function of law following the Bolshevik Revolution was that Marx did not
expressly formulate the contours of post-revolutionary law and the state.'
Had Marx theorized law as he had intended, it is likely that the
Bolsheviks' piety to his teachings would have reduced the ensuing legal
drama to a well-managed bureaucratic transition. 8 Absent that, it was left
to the Bolsheviks to navigate the problems of managing a failed state
through a series of foreign and domestic challenges while attempting to
create consistent theoretical justification for their actions.
The most influential application of Marxist theory to the problem of
political reorganization following the proletarian revolution was by Lenin
himself in his State and Revolution.9 Here, Lenin restated the main theses
of Marx and Engels on the state, including the theory of class rule,
formulated the theory of a Marxist state ruled by the proletarian class, and
defended his conception against "opportunists," including the German
Social-Democrats and English Fabians from the Second International.
Lenin outlined the class nature of governments, the origins and role of the
state, and bourgeois' use of class antagonism in maintaining the state.' 0 He
further critiqued what he described as a petit-bourgeois illusion of gradual
transformation of capitalism into socialism without revolution.
7. Marx touches upon issues of law and economic relations as a basis for law in his Critique of
the Gotha Program. See KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM (Int'l Publ. Co., Inc. 1938)
(1875). But he does not offer a theory of law, or a programmatic analysis of the role of law in a
communist society.
8. B.B. JIAHAEBA, BOnPOCbI LIPABA B KAIIHTAJ1E MAPKCA 5 6 (1Op. JIIT., 1982)
[VALENTINA VIKTORONA LAPAEVA, QUESTIONS OF LAW IN MARX'S CAPITAL, 5-6 (Jur. Lit. 1982)].
Lapaeva's succinct explanation of the doctrinal disagreements between eminent theorists P.I. Stuchka
and E.B. Pashukanis, on the one hand, and I. Razumovsky, on the other, provides an excellent
summary of the debates and is a good starting point for scholars interested in understanding the official
post-Stalin position on Pashukanis. According to Lapaeva, Razumovsky was able to demonstrate,
unlike Pashukanis, that abstract and concrete conceptions of the legal form did not necessarily require
the abolition of law, since law did not encompass all relations between property owners, but rather
represented only one aspect of economic relations. Id. at 7-9.
9. See JIEHHH, FOCY)IAPCTBO H PEBOJnOIfIH: YUEHHE MAPKCH3MA o FOCY)JAPCTBE H
3AAAqH HPOJIETAPHATA B PEBOJIOJHIIH (1917) (Ho§IHoe co6paHHe coq., 5 H3,. T 33 c. 1-120)
[VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION (Robert Service trans., Penguin 1992)].
10. Lenin theorized that despite differences in form between modern bourgeois states
(parliamentary, traditional monarchic), the dictatorship of the capital owning class (the bourgeois
class) over the proletarian united these diverse forms.
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According to Lenin, following a socialist revolution, the dictatorship of
the proletariat would develop into a strong, centralized democratic base of
Soviets (or workers' councils). The central communist party would play a
guiding role in the construction of this socialist state by ensuring
discipline, organization, and redistribution of material resources. Most
importantly, Lenin developed and theorized Marx/Engel's writings on the
dual phases of communism, the immediate socialist state following a
socialist revolution, and a higher phase of communism which would
finally see the withering away of the state. Contrary to Bukharinj Lenin
claimed that the transition to communism could only come after
strengthening the state administrative organs and consolidating power in
the hands of the Soviets and the party. Furthermore, this consolidation of
power would coincide with the development of other proletarian
movements across the world. Thus, Lenin theorized the importance and,
indeed, inevitability of the transition period as a political and strategic
necessity, but also as a forceful rhetorical and argumentative tool. As we
shall see, this formulation would serve as the basis for Korovin's transition
theory of international law and all subsequent Soviet theories of
international law until the development of the doctrine of permanent
peaceful coexistence in 1963. This transition theory would also have a
direct impact on the development of private law in the early Soviet state.
Per Lenin, until the "highest form of communism" arose, the party
would need to exercise strict control over society and the state to regulate
labor, production, and consumption.1 2 This highest form of communism
would occur when society would overcome the differences between
physical and mental labor, divisions of standards of living between urban
and rural workers, and as a result of the mixing of nations (ethnicities). 13
In State and Revolution, Lenin did not specify the role of law in the
transition from bourgeois order to socialism; indeed law is mentioned but
once in a discussion of the Anti-Socialist Law in Germany. 4 However, in
The Proletarian Revolution in Russia, a collection of articles and speeches
by Lenin and Trotsky, it was clear that legal control was meant to be
11. H. FyxapHH, K meopuu unwnepuaqucmuqecio'o -ocyoapcm6a, PEBOJ1tOILqT HPABA 5 (H3'a.
KOM. AKaj., 1925) [Nikolai Bukharin, Towt'ards a Theory of the Imperialist State, in REVOLUTSIA
PRAVA 5 (Communist Acad. 1925)]. To Bukharin, the post-revolutionary state existed only in a
transitory moment and could not be strengthened after the revolution. The state apparatus had to be
reduced in direct correlation with the elimination of classes. Id. at 13. This directly contradicted
Lenin's position on the need to strengthen the communist apparatus.
12. LENIN, supra note 9, at 97.
13. Id. at 93-97.
14. Id.
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exercised directly by the Soviets through direct democracy.15 But
immediately a theoretical crisis presented itself.
According to Marx, the state and the law are elements of a social
superstructure determined by the economic relations and activities (the
base) of the ruling classes of a particular society. If the purpose of the
Soviet state was to destroy this superstructure and replace it with a
domestic communist order, then law should have had no function in the
new Soviet state. In other words, because law was the manifestation of
class struggle and reinforced class difference, the abolition of class would
require the simultaneous abolition of law. This thesis was famously
theorized by the early Soviet legal philosopher Evgeny Pashukanis (1891-
1937) in his 1924 General Theory of Law and Marxism.16 Pashukanis went
even further than merely exposing the logical inconsistency of maintaining
law in a classless society. He argued that since law arose as a consequence
of property exchange, it was necessary to eliminate law in an effort to
disrupt the cycle of property rights, commodity fetishism, and material
relations between individuals in the new Soviet state. 17 In short, law went
hand in hand with property and vice versa. Only by abolishing both law
and property could individuals rise to a higher form of social
consciousness and political awareness.18
Analogously, on the international plane, it was theoretically impossible
for the Soviet Union to exist in a world system of law which was built by
the bourgeois and imperialist ruling class, comprised of the powerful
imperial nations that reached their zenith in the nineteenth century. 19 These
differences between socialism and capitalism were deemed a priori to be
irreconcilable by some jurists (like Stuchka and Pashukanis).2 ° Other early
Soviet jurists, like A.G. Goikhbarg, however, saw the potential of
reinventing law to serve the interest of the proletarian class through the
creation of the Bolshevik law that would administer the dictatorship of the
15. VLADIMIR LENIN & LEON TROTSKY, THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA 83 (1918).
16. PASHUKANIS, supra note 6.
17. Id. at 109 33.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 6 (arguing that a subject under international law is identical to a subject under
municipal law).
20. Id. at 52 ("CoBpeMeHHOe MeWRyHapoRHoe ripaBo BKIIoqaeT B ce6A BeCbMa COJIH2JHYLO 2Io3y
camoynpaBcyBa (peTopcHH, penpeccalHH, BOIHbl H T. J.)" ["Contemporary international law includes
a solid dose of contradictory 'self-regulation' (retribution, repression, war, etc.)."]). Id. at 67 n.148
("[...] B Me)KL1yHap0JHbIX OTHOHeHHMX rocy)IapCTBO BicTyrIaeT BOBCe He Kal B0CHIOIIeIHHe
o6teKTHBHOI HOpMbI, HO KaK HOCHTeib cy6,eKTHBHb[X npaB, T. e. Co BCeMH aTpH6yTaMIi
cy6cTaHHoHabHocTH H 3FoHCTHqeCKo 3aHHTepecoBaHHocTH." ["[... ] in international relations, the
state does not act as embodying objective norms, but acts as a holder of subjective rights, that is with
all of the attributes of substantive and egoistic self-interestedness."]).
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proletariat.21 In international law, this meant the creation of a Bolshevik
legal order or a socialist international law governing relations between
Socialist-dominant states and capitalist states.2
Although he was an attorney who often spoke and wrote on such
central topics as self-determination, sovereignty, non-intervention, and
international economic law, Lenin did not participate in these core
theoretical debates 3 This occurred for at least three reasons. First, as the
chief executive of the Soviet state, Lenin was too preoccupied with more
urgent matters of war and peace. During the first two months of Soviet
Russia's existence, for instance, Lenin issued more than forty decrees
concerning foreign relations.24 In the first five years (1917-1922), more
25than 270 legal acts were adopted concerning foreign relations. Second, it
is well-known that Lenin preferred to write in populist form to emphasize
26the relevance of his theories to the working masses . Therefore, it is not
surprising that he avoided the theoretical fights on the pages of Soviet law
21. A.G. Goikhbarg was the first Director of the Institute of Soviet Law from 1922 to 1925. After
Pashukanis gained control over the Soviet legal academy in 1932, he expelled Goikhbarg from his
teaching post for maintaining "bourgeois" attachment to the notion of Soviet law. Goikhbarg was
ultimately jailed, but rehabilitated after WWII.
22. EBFEHHfi A. KOPOBHH, ME)K)IYHAPOHOE HPABO HEPEXOWJHOFO BPEMEHH (M., 1924)
[EVGENY A. KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD (1924)].
23. In fact, his writings on international law were ultimately collected and published as a
standalone volume by the Soviet Institute of International Relations. JIEHHH 0 ME)K YHAPOWHOfi
FIOJIHTHKE H ME, LCYHAPOIHOM HPABE (H3A-BO HH-Ta Me)K [yHapO2HbIX OTHOflieHHHi, 1958) [LENIN
ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL LAW (Moscow State Institute of International
Relations 1958)]; see also V.I. LENIN, QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POLICY (Foreign Languages Pub].
House 1959) (devoted mainly to self-determination and related questions). In 1970, the Soviet Union
issued a volume of Lenin's contributions to international law, edited by Tunkin and V.F. Fedorov.
F.H. TyHKIH, B.1i). ctejopoB, peO., B.H. J1EHHH H COBPEMEHHOE ME)K{YHAPOHOE FIPABO (MOCKBa,
3naine 1970) [V.I. LENIN AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (G.I. Tunkin & V.F. Fedorov
eds., Znanie 1970)]. For a short overview of Lenin's contributions to international law, see F.B.
HFHaTeHKO, B. H. J1enun u iedtcOyHapoOnoe npa6o, 2 HPABOBE)JEHHE 98-108 (1970), available at
http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID-1133126 (Russian).
24. H.B. MHPOHOB, HPABOBOE PEVYJITPOBAHHE BHEIUJHX CHOIIIEH4I4 CCCP (1917-1970) 7
(HMO, 1971) [N.V. MIRoNov, LEGAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE USSR (1917-
1970) 7 (IMO 1971)] (providing an excellent anthology of legal reforms pertaining to foreign relations
bodies in the Soviet Union from 1917-1970).
25. Id. Despite his weakened physical condition, Lenin remained actively involved in executive
decisions on matters of war and the status of the USSR in foreign relations. Lenin's responses to
ongoing peace negotiations with the Central Powers, for instance, and exchanges between him, Stalin,
and Trotsky regarding the Georgia Affair and legal status of Transcaucasian Socialist Federative
Soviet Republic showed that he was exceptionally sensitive to how the USSR was being perceived
abroad. ld.
26. HI.H. CTyqKa, JIeuH u Pe6onozuonnbdi OeKpem, PEBOJIIOIHAH HPABA 32 (H3,J. KOM. AKaa.,
1925) [P.I. Stuchka, Lenin and the Revolutionary Decree, REVOLUTSIA PRAVA 32 (1925)] (telling the
anecdote that even Stuchka, despite being intimately familiar with Lenin's work, did not know that
Lenin was a lawyer until the two of them were buying a printing press in Spring 1917 and Lenin
presented his bar card to the seller).
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journals. Third, by 1922 (when these debates began in earnest) Lenin was
effectively incapacitated by a stroke caused by an assassin's bullet. Lenin
died in January 1924 just as Pashukanis' and Korovin's main treatises
were being published.
For these reasons, modern historians and especially legal scholars do
not treat Lenin's writings on international law seriously. However, in the
context of a Soviet conception of international law and property, Lenin's
writings are key to understanding the overarching spirit of
pragmatism/realism, while staying true to core Marxist tenets.2 7 Lenin's
influence on Soviet international law remained profound in two respects.
First, Lenin explicitly sanctioned the idea of legal instrumentalism, or
the notion that law needed to serve a particular policy end. Though law
was theoretically indeterminate, unnecessary, and ultimately a bourgeois
fiction,28 law and legal process were necessary to further the cause of
communism in the immediate transition period. This methodology directly
influenced an entire generation of pre-WWII and post-war Soviet jurists.
Indeed, legal instrumentalism (and perhaps, exceptionalism) in
international law would go on to be the Soviets' most enduring
contribution to mainstream international law.29 Second, how early Soviet
jurists rationalized and justified radical departures from Marxist doctrine
to carry out diametrically opposed policy reforms sheds light on the
Soviets' particular sensibility, or mentaliti, concerning law.
Understanding this intellectual dynamic can explain not just how Soviets
wanted to have their cake and eat it too, that is to say, how Soviet law on
the books differed from "law in action." More importantly, by unpacking
why and how Soviet Russia betrayed its avowed ideals in exchange for
tangible benefits (recognition, material aid, so on), we can better
27. After WWII, scholars attempted to systematize Marx's and Lenin's writings on international
law. Notable among these was Tunkin's 1970 work. F.H. TyHKHH, B.0. (DeJopoB, B.H. Jlenun u
coqpemvefn-oe AmedtcoynapoOinoe npa6o, 2 FOCYAAPCTBO H HPABO (1970) [G.I. Tunkin, V.F. Fedorov,
VI. Lenin and Contemporary International Law, 2 STATE AND LAW (1970)]; B.&D. Fy6nH, Kap-4
MapKc u iebcynapo6noe npa~o, 2 FOCYAAPCTBO H FIPABO (1969) [V.F. Gubin, Karl Marx and
International Law, 2 STATE AND LAW (1969)]. These journals are not to be confused with the separate
periodical of the Institute of State and Law, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo.
28. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Yale 1922). The parallel
between Pound's policy-oriented sociological jurisprudence and early socialist legal theory
(representative of early Soviet legal realism and American legal realism, respectively) are
underresearched and deserve greater scrutiny. For one move in this direction, see generally MICHAEL
HEAD, PASHUKANIS: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL (2004); Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A
Study in the Development ofJMarxian Legal Theory, 47 MICH. L. REv. 1157 (1949).
29. Contemporary scholars trace the theoretical roots of exceptionalism to Carl Schmitt, but
Evgeny Korovin's 1924 International Law of the Transition Period arguably influenced Schmitt to a
greater extent than has been previously understood. See KOROVIN, supra note 22.
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understand how the very notions of law, legality, and socialist justice,
were co-opted, made indeterminate, and ultimately served as nothing but
rhetorical gestures.30 Two historical moments illustrate how the early
Soviet Union came to recognize and protect intellectual property rights
while being ostensibly opposed to law, property, and like "bourgeois
notions." First, there was the need to attract foreign trade and project
respect for foreign property rights pursuant to international obligations.
Second, this need for property protection was internalized into the
domestic legal order.
1. The Dilemma of Attracting Foreign Trade (Pragmatism &
International Law)
Modern histories of early Soviet law neglect the economic constraints
that molded Soviet international legal practice, instead focusing on major
events such as Russia's negotiations of the many peace treaties with WWI
adversaries and later accession into the League of Nations and subsequent
expulsion therefrom. Most scholars list historical and political reasons as
lying at the root of Soviet preference for a classic conception of
international law (strict sovereignty, anti-monism, etc.). 3 1 In international
relations, the early years of the Bolshevik state (1918-1920) are
commonly seen as when the Soviets developed a foreign policy based on
expediency and an ad hoc application of Marxist principles in relations
with imperialist states to gain recognition and political legitimacy.
But economic realities had a more direct influence on the shaping of
Soviet notions of international law and the place of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics ("USSR") vis-d-vis the capitalist states. Even hardline
Marxist legal theorists like Pashukanis acknowledged how profoundly
material conditions would affect the development of Soviet international
legal doctrine. As Pashukanis wrote in his brief entry on "peaceful
blockades," the Allies, having realized that the Bolsheviks had defeated
the counter-revolutionaries, lifted their blockade of Soviet Russia on
January 16, 1920 because it was an economic necessity for them to trade
30. Following Prof. Butler, this mentalit, in turn, may bear directly on how contemporary
Russian jurists approach law. See Butler, Introduction, supra note 1, at xiii.
31. See, e.g., GEORGE GINSBURGS, FROM SOVIET To RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW: STUDIES IN
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (1998); TARJA LANGSTROM, TRANSFORMATION N RUSSIA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); Emanuel Margolis, Certain Aspects of the Impact of Communism on
International Law at 5 13 (Mar. 1951) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,
Department of Government).
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with Russia.32 Pashukanis was not unique in situating core theoretical
disagreements with bourgeois international lawyers in a broader context of
trade relations and material conditions, although his position is remarkable
in that he framed the discourse in such a way that it appeared the West
needed to compromise with the USSR, rather than vice versa. However,
prior to any official recognition of the USSR under international law, it
was the Soviet Union rather than bourgeois states that was seeking foreign
trade. According to Korovin, "[b]y 1921, after the final act of the foreign
intervention in the Russian civil war, and the final defeat of Wrangel in
1919-1920, the Soviet Union shifted to negotiations and began seeking
compromises and business relationships."33 This is not splitting hairs.
Since as both Korovin and Pashukanis claimed that material conditions
determined the substance of international law, it is important to understand
correctly the material conditions of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic ("RSFSR") and how this affected doctrinal developments.
In fact, despite the high-flying rhetoric of worker's councils, global
revolution, and the withering away of law, property, and state, by the early
1920s, the territory of the former Russian empire lay in economic ruin.34
By 1919, as a consequence of the Great War, the Revolution, the ensuing
Civil War, a blockade, the armed allied intervention, and Bolshevik
agricultural policies, the Russian economy had essentially flatlined.35 In
32. E. HaHyKaHHc, Mupnax BRoKaOa, DHIFKJIOHEIU4M FOCY)JAPCTBA H FIPABA, T. 2, 1002,
1003 (1925 1926) [Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Peaceful Blockade, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATE AND LAW,
v. 2, 1002, 1003 (1925-1926)].
33. KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, supra note 22, at 60.
34. It is generally agreed that the material situation worsened precipitously from 1917 to 1922. In
Socialist and Imperialist Diplomacy, Chicherin's report to the Fifth Congress in July 1918, he remarks
that the goal of Soviet foreign policy was staying on the "revolutionary offensive" while coping with
the "unbelievable deterioration" from the effects of the Great War and Tsarism. LENIN & TROTSKY,
THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA 409-10 (1918). Furthermore, this was a period of intense
violence and uncertainty in Russia, not only among the general population but also in the diplomatic
corps. The assassination of the German ambassador, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach, on April 23, 1918
shortly after his arrival in Moscow, presented a very real legitimacy challenge for the Soviet state. Id.
at 410. Economic historians, politicians and literary figures also paint a grim tale regarding Russia's
economy during this period. See AJ1EKCEHi TOJICTO71, XOXKCEHHE nO MYKAM (POMAH TPHlOFTET),
KHHIA 3: XMYPOE YTPO (1922 1941) [ALEKSEY TOLSTOY, THE ORDEAL (NOVEL TRILOGY), BOOK 3:
BLEAK MORNING (1922-1941)] (describing the social conditions in Russia in the historical period
following the Soviet revolution). This image is strikingly similar to Josef Koudelka's famous photo of
Prague's Wenceslas Square, nearly empty at noon on August 21, 1968, during the Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia.
35. Nikolay Bukharin, Economics of the Transition Period (1920), in THE POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD (K.J. Tarbuck ed., 1979); NIKOLAY BUKHARIN, IMPERIALISM
AND WORLD ECONOMY (Howard Fennig ed., 1966); Charles Noble Gregory, The International Labor
Organization of the League ofNations, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 49 (1921) ("The Soviet press shows
that, excluding railroad employees, workers in industry decreased 2,402,000 men up to January, 1919,
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addition, as a result of droughts and crop failures in 1920, Russia
36
encountered a major famine in 1921.
With the failure of communist revolutions in Europe, by 1922 it
became clear that "the building of socialism or communism involved
industrialization," or a surrender to the hostile capitalists encircling
Russia. 7 On the domestic front, Lenin masterminded the famous (and
domestically controversial) 38 New Economic Policy ("NEP") program,
issued by decree on March 21, 1921, to revive the economy. 9 Yet a lesser-
known aspect of NEP was its focus on reviving international trade,
particularly with respect to exports of grain and raw materials and imports
of industrial machinery. Just as international trade presented a strategic
dilemma-restarting international trade meant cooperating with the same
hostile capitalists the Bolsheviks had so fiercely opposed-the
contradictions between NEP and Marxist theory could not have been
greater.
As a further strain on the tensions between Marxist theory and actual
Soviet policies, in 1921 the Soviet Union began praying for material
sustenance from the "capitalist" West to relieve the effects of the famine.4°
Then, as now, the United States was one of the first states to respond. By
summer 1921, the American Relief Administration ("ARA"), headed by
Herbert Hoover, began delivering medical supplies and foodstuffs, along
and a report of the Supreme Council of Popular Economy of March, 1919, states that production in the
greater number of Russian industries has decreased 400 to 500 per cent.").
36. FRANK ALFRED GOLDER & LINCOLN HUTCHINSON, ON THE TRAIL OF THE RUSSIAN FAMINE
(Stanford 1927); see also WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE N RUSSIA: THE PASSAGES OF FRANK
GOLDER, 1914 1927 89 (Terence Emmons & Bertrand M. Patenaude eds., Hoover Press 1992)
[hereinafter WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE N RUSSIA] (describing drought in 1920-1921 and the
major famine in Russia stretching from the Volga valley and into southern Ukraine).
37. ALEC NOVE, ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND SOVIET POLITICS; OR, WAS STALIN REALLY
NECESSARY? 21 (1964).
38. The NEP enveloped and called into question the core premises of the Bolshevik revolution,
including the protection of private property, land reform, and accommodation of the bourgeois
merchant class.
39. Some Russian sources place this event on March 23, 1921. The decree "On the Replacement
of Prodrazvyorstka [Foodstuffs Requisition] by Prodnalog [Foodstuffs Tax]" was issued on March 21,
1921. See IeKpeT BIJHK, HpiHTnHf Ha OCHoBe pemeHnJA X cie3ja PKHI(6) "0 3aMeHe pa3BePCTKH
HaTypaaJbHbiM HaJo0oM" (21 mapTa 1921 F.), available at http://www.hrono.info/dokum/prod nal.html
(last accessed Oct. 25, 2011); see also Peqb Ba inMHpa HaIbHqa JIeHna <<O npRo[BoaLbCTBeHHoM
naJIore Hm 0 npo0naJIore H 0 CBO602JHOM o6MeHe xiie6HbIx n3HnIiIKOB)) [V.I. Lenin, On Foodstuff
Tax and/or Free Exchange of Excess Wheat Production (Mar. 21, 1921), speech], available at http:/
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/eb/Lenin_-_AboutNatural Tax.ogg.
40. In July 1921, writer Maxim Gorky (at the behest of Lenin) issued an appeal to "all honest
citizens" to send food and medical supplies to Soviet Russia.
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with private aid from workers unions and individuals.41 On August 20,
1921, in response to Gorky's call for aid, the ARA and the Soviet
government signed the Riga Agreement, which stipulated that the ARA
had the "right to control its relief operations inside Russia in exchange for
a vow to not mix with Soviet politics. ' 42 Similar agreements were signed
with the German Red Cross organizations and other states' relief
organizations. 43 But it was U.S. aid that attracted particular interest and ire
from the Soviets.
On the one hand, the ARA aid humiliated the Bolsheviks, who not only
resented the notion of imperialists "bailing out" socialists, but were also
uneasy about a foreign organization with a sizeable local staff operating
throughout much of the country.44 The suspicion was shared, though it was
ultimately resolved to mutual benefit.45 As a matter of international law,
Korovin was also alarmed by relief organizations' claims to extraterritorial
41. WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA, supra note 36. Golder, an archivist and Director
of the Hoover Library at Stanford University, travelled extensively throughout revolutionary Russia.
He also served on the American Relief Administration, formerly a government aid agency, but by that
time a private relief organization headed by then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover. Id. at ix-
xxvi.
42. Id. at 90 (citing HAROLD H. FISHER, THE FAMINE IN SOVIET RUSSIA, 1919-1923: THE
OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION (1927)). Archival records reveal the vast
scope of the ARA operation:
The initial plan was for the ARA to feed two to three million children, but the mission rapidly
expanded to include adults and medical relief as well. The major leap forward came on
December 22, 1921, when President Warren Harding signed into law a congressional
appropriation of $20 million for the purchase of corn and seed grain from U.S. farmers for
Russian relief To this total other government and private U.S. contributions were added (as
well as a Soviet government expenditure of nearly $12 million from its gold reserve); in the
end the two-year ARA program amounted to more than $60 million.
Id.
43. TIMOTHY A. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (Macmillan
1935).
44. WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA, supra note 36, at 90; see also KOROVIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, supra note 22, at 63 (recalling negotiations with
"representatives of the International Red Cross, and with personal friends of the American president,
vacationing billionaires, and commercial groups"). This resentment echoes Russia's post-2000 turn
against the foreign aid establishment.
45. WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE N RUSSIA, supra note 36, at 90.
The ARA mission was headed by a career army officer, Colonel William N. Haskell, most of
whose U.S. staff had served in the American Expeditionary Force. Many men had attended
some of the finest U.S. colleges and universities and had had experience with the ARA in
Europe. They were eager to tackle the Russian job with trademark ARA drive and efficiency
and had little tolerance for Soviet inefficiency and suspicion; they especially resented the
netwvork of Red Army commissars and agents of the secret police set up to monitor their
activities. There were many ARA-Soviet confrontations over issues big and small, but each
was somehow resolved through diplomacy. In the end the Soviet government officially
acknowledged the ARA's contribution in checking the famine and saving millions of lives.
Id. (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction and wrote at length about the need to limit the legal status of
foreign charitable organizations operating in the Soviet Union. Writing in
the first volume of the journal Sovetskoe Pravo, for instance, Korovin
stressed the importance of limiting the rights of foreign organizations
operating on Soviet soil, while recognizing the need to set reasonable
permissions to aid famine relief efforts.46
On the other hand, NEP and foreign aid programs in the early 1920s
certainly worked, as evidenced by the increase in international trade and
betterment of material conditions in Russia during that period. Between
the years 1921 and 1925, for instance, trade with the United States
quadrupled.47 During this time, the USSR also entered into a large number
of bilateral treaties with European states to normalize trade relations. 48
Each of these agreements stipulated that the USSR would honor foreign
investors' property rights on its territory, in sharp break from the
nationalization decrees issued in the immediate aftermath of the
Revolution. 49 To facilitate this process, between 1922 and 1924, the Soviet
diplomatic apparatus was restructured to avoid conflicts between the
consular representatives abroad and the foreign trade representatives
working under the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade
("NarKomVneshTorg"). 50 Ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the
Soviet agricultural and industrial production returned to pre-war (pre-
46. E.A. KopoBHH, MHocmpanatq cru ,amponuqeciast Oe31me,7bnocmb 6 PCCP u ee npae6o6b
4Dop.14bl, 1(1) COBETCKOE IJPABO 108 (1922) [Evgeny A. Korovin, Foreign Philanthropic Activity in
the RSFSR and its Legal Forms, 1(1) SOVIET LAW 108 (1922)]. In his International Lant, of the
Transition Period, he was more direct: "A charitable organization-[such as the Red Cross]-claiming
universality over territorial sovereignty of nations is the same legal nonsense as the attempt of a
corporation to claim rights under family law." KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION
PERIOD, supra note 22, at 35.
47. The United States and Soviet Russia signed a "Memorandum on Trade" in January 1921. See
JOHN SPARGO, MEMORANDUM ON TRADE WITH SOVIET RUSSIA: SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1921). These estimates are tentative because
significant portions of the increased trade were relief shipments by the United States. See U.S.
BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE, COMMERCE REPORTS, VOL. 4, at 561 (Oct. to Dec.,
1922). In March 1921, the RSFSR also extended the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 16,
1921, though disputes with Great Britain over the Wrangell Islands and the intervention led to a slight
decrease in trade in 1923.
48. TARACOUZIO, supra note 43, at 143-50.
49. Id.
50. KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, supra note 22, at 69
(discussing the purpose of the Soviet consulates as being limited to: "(a) protection of economic and
legal interests of the RSFSR; (b) official representation of RSFSR and other Soviet organs in the given
states; (c) the protection of interests economic, legal and social of citizens of the RSFSR and its
legal entities and firms") (emphasis added).
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1913) levels.51 By 1930, Soviet administrators and scholars openly prided
themselves on the exponential increase in trade with European powers and
with the United States during the 1920s. 52
The benefits of these bilateral trade treaties, of course, flowed both
ways. From the Soviet side, the treaties were conditioned on explicit
recognition of the Soviet state under international law.53 Therefore, the
USSR acquired significant leverage and legitimacy from initiating trade
relations. In turn, the bilateral treaties of commerce provided Western
European powers and U.S. firms with access to Russian goods and
concessions. In essence, the bilateral trade agreements provided most-
favored nation guarantees, "either in its absolute form, or under the form
of a conditional (compensational) favoredness, occasionally giving way to
preferential regulations more or less extensive in scope. 54 Two concrete
examples-the issue of concessions and foreign debt-show the extent to
which Soviet leaders bowed to foreign pressure during this time. This, in
turn, helps to contextualize the IP reforms in the crucial early years of the
Soviet state.
Concessions. Prior to 1928, the Soviet Union recognized three forms of
foreign involvement in the Soviet economy: (1) direct concessions;
(2) foreign investment in Soviet firms established pursuant to Soviet law;
(3) operation of foreign firms on Soviet soil. 55 With the start of the first
5 1. Boris Skvirsky, Russia's Internal Situation and Foreign Policy Russian-American Trade
Relations, 138 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 97, 99 (1928). Skvirsky's official title before the
restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and U.S.S.R. was that of Director of the
Soviet Union Information Bureau, Washington D.C. Id. at 97.
52. T. JIJKJIOBCKHni, Bonpocbz op,'aHu3afuu Gueueu u Guympunefu mopteoa.u, 7 COBETCKOE
FoC. H PEBOJIIOI4HA HIPABA 74 (1930) [T. Shklovsky, Questions of Organization of Internal and
Foreign Trade, 7 Soy. Gos. i Revolutsia Prava 74 (1930)]. Shklovsky's article contains useful data on
Soviet private, public, and cooperative foreign trade during the period 1923 to 1929.
53. See TARACOUZIO, supra note 43, at 258-60. Taracouzio, however, incorrectly dates the first
of the economic agreements between the USSR and Western Powers as being the March 16, 1921
agreement between the USSR and Great Britain. In actuality, the US-Soviet Memorandum on Trade
dated January 1921 was the first, though Taracouzio is correct that the Soviet-British agreement served
as the model for the subsequent treaties with European powers. These treaties included, inter alia,
Provisional Agreement with Germany of May 6, 1921; Provisional Agreement with Norway of
September 2, 1921; Treaty of December 7, 1921 with Austria; Provisional Agreement with Italy of
December 26, 1921; Provisional Agreement with Sweden of March 1, 1922; Provisional Treaty with
Czechoslovakia of June 5, 1922; Agreement with Denmark of April 23, 1923. Id.
54. Evgeny A. Korovin, Soviet Treaties and International Law, 22 AM. J. INTL L. 753, 754
(1928). By "compensational favoredness," Korovin meant the right of the Soviet state to apply
preferential regulations to commerce "with the border states, forming, prior to 1917, part of the
Russian Empire . I..." d. at 756. This theme of regional trade preferences for the near-abroad is
strikingly similar to recent regional integration efforts by the Russian Federation.
55. M. fllOTKHH, 17papa uuocmpanyeG na coepe. 4erno.i 9mane, 3 COBETCKOE FOCYMAPCTBO
75 (1934) [M. Plotkin, The Rights of Foreigners at the Current Stage, 3 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO
75 (1934)].
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five-year plan (1928-1933), the Soviet Union did not award a single
additional concession, and sought to restrict existing concessions on the
basis of special agreements by purchasing remainder rights from the
holders.56 The remaining concessions were insignificant. According to
Soviet sources, private industry at the end of the first five-year plan
represented only 0.07% of the Soviet industrial output.5 7 Similarly, joint
stock companies founded in the USSR with foreign capital during the NEP
period were progressively liquidated. During the first five year period, no
additional joint stock companies with foreign capital were formed. 58 The
decrees of the Central Executive Committee, dated March 11, 1931, also
slightly liberalized the rules pertaining to foreign firms and their
representatives operating in the Soviet Union. Pursuant to Article 12 of
this decree, firms engaged in negotiations with Soviet trade representatives
in Russia no longer had to register and apply for licenses prior to entering
into negotiations. 59
The Soviet international law establishment was fully engaged in
support of foreign trade. This is evident not only in the spirit of doctrinal
writings such as Korovin's dispatches to the American Journal of
International Law, but also in calls for substantive reforms to existing
treaties and trade agreements. For instance, by 1930-1931, the Soviet legal
academy was mobilized in opposition to a new round of trade tariffs from
the United States. Within months of the announcement of Article 307 of
the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (prohibiting the importation of goods made
with forced labor), Soviet international lawyers produced a series of
articles critiquing the trade law on general political, as well as substantive,
grounds. 60 The expectation of continued growth in foreign trade during the
second five-year plan also required changes in the constitutions of the
individual Soviet republics. Extensive protections were afforded to foreign
enterprises and their employees operating on Soviet soil. For instance,
pursuant to an instruction of the Central Executive Committee dated
56. Id. at 76.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 77 (discussing liquidation proceedings against the companies Ratao and Sovpoltorg).
59. Id. at 77.
60. 3KoHoA umUcKaqt 60pboa KanumalucmuqecKux cmpan npomu6 CCCP, 3 COBETCKOE FOC. H
PEBOJIIOIHAH HPABA 113, 117 (1931) [Economic Warfare of the Capitalist States 17ersus the Soviet
Union, 3 Soy. Gos. i REVOLUTSIA PRAVA 113, 117 (1931)] (proposing the existence of covert
economic warfare against the early Soviet Union). Raevich also published an article disputing the
American allegations that Soviet goods were produced with forced labor. Id. at 127.
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October 3, 1930, foreign workers were granted all formal political rights,
including the right to vote.61
Foreign Debt. Another external constraint shaping Soviet attitudes on
foreign relations and domestic legal reform was the large foreign debt
owed to the United States, France, and England, which the Soviet Union
62inherited from the Tsarist and Kerensky governments. 2 The original
position of the RSFSR was to revoke all debt obligations to Europe and
the United States on the basis that these debts were neither incurred by the
toiling masses nor on their behalf.63 However, debt negotiations formed a
major part of early Soviet diplomatic efforts with the West, as evidenced
by Chicherin's report of October 28, 1921 and the report of January
1922.64 These notes show that Soviet leaders could not sustain their
opposition to the debt, as the issue became a major bargaining point of the
Western powers towards the USSR. In response, the Soviet delegations
slowly gave way on these issues. First, they acknowledged several
important distinctions between classes of debt. Pre-1914 debt was
acknowledged as possibly valid because it was issued for the purpose of
developing Russia's economy, whereas post-1914 debt was issued to
sustain the imperial war effort.65 Moreover, the Soviet Union countered
with a number of offsets, consisting of two classes of claims: (1) for "[t]he
value of Russian assets situated abroad"; and (2) for the value of "damages
resulting from the Allied intervention . . .. , By 1925, the Soviet
government agreed to pay outstanding debts to European states by
modifying a number of terms, including reduction of the amounts of the
debt.67 The outstanding debt owed to the United States, however, remained
unsettled.
Diplomatic notes show the debt to have been a major point of
contention between the United States and the Soviet Union well into the
mid-1930s. In addition to setting debt repayment as a precondition for
61. Plotkin, supra note 55, at 78. The favorable treatment of foreign workers (including
government subsidies) was meant to demonstrate the equitable work conditions of the Soviet state.
Indeed, according to one Soviet scholar, the only distinction between foreign workers and Soviet
citizens was simply the conception of 'foreignness" the existence of which was, again, necessitated
by capitalist encirclement. Id.
62. KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINES AND
DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 95 97 (SitIhoff 1970).
63. The unilateral revocation of all outstanding debts was announced by Lenin in a decree on
January 2 I/February 3, 1918. International Law Reports, 162.
64. GRZYBOWSKI, supra note 62, at 95 96.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 96.
67. Id.
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recognition of the USSR, the United States set the following requirements
for the USSR to: (1) reject its call for a world revolution and cease
propaganda activities; (2) reverse its decree regarding the annulment of
international debt obligations (not just United States); 68 and (3) agree to
recognize its international obligations (generally). 69 The last point-the
agreement to recognize general principles of international law-related
directly to respect for foreign property rights on the Soviet territory, an
issue of central importance to the present discussion. The initial Soviet
response was flippant: the Soviet Union did not need any legal or de facto
recognition from the West.70 However, this posture was disingenuous, as
the Soviet Union certainly sought recognition from the United States, and
the Soviets were expending great diplomatic efforts to win U.S.
recognition.7'
In international law, Korovin justified the Soviet debt annulment by
reference to his class/transition theory-essentially arguing that the Soviet
social revolution created a radically new legal form that was qualitatively
72different from other states. Korovin admitted that ordinarily any
successor state was bound by the legal and financial obligations of its
predecessor, but refused to acknowledge the Soviet debt on the basis of
communist principles. Diplomatic history and the facts of the actual debt
service by the Soviet state reveal a slightly different story.
First, it is important to understand that the Soviet state initially
continued to service (pay interest on) the debt, even following the decree
on annulment.73 This supports the theory that the Soviet Union sought to
68. The debt was partly due to the enormous increase in Russian-American trade (primarily
exports from the United States to Russia during WWI). See GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE DECISION TO
INTERVENE 323-24 (Princeton 1958) (discussing the influence of private American interests on the
decision to intervene, including American-Russian Chamber of Commerce composed of bankers (A.B.
Hepburn), industrialists and "[t]hirty to forty other firms").
69. Id. at 20.
70. Id.
71. This position is surprising because the Soviet Union had worked exceedingly hard at gaining
recognition of European powers. The stance vis-a-vis the United States may have been a negotiating
tactic, but it certainly did not resemble the prior negotiation efforts.
72. KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, supra note 22, at 30.
73. Interestingly, in 1987 a class action case was decided in which a firm sued the Soviet Union
in a U.S. district court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") to recover part of the
debt ($75 million, representing a $25 million issue in 1916 and a $50 million issue by the Tsarist
government in 1917). See Carl Marks & Co. v. USSR, 665 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd per
curiam, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988). The court denied the claim,
holding that the FSIA would not apply retroactively to the Imperial-era bond issue. Carl Marks & Co.,
665 F. Supp. at 337. After reviewing case law, the court also held that as late as 1926, the USSR (like
any foreign sovereign) would have expected absolute immunity from suit in the United States. Id. at
339. The USSR had a justified expectation that it would not be retroactively sued in the United States.
The case is noteworthy for its succinct retelling of the relevant facts of the debt issue. Id. at 324-32.
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project adherence to international norms and bilateral agreements even
when they ran counter to the professed ideology.74 Perhaps more
importantly, servicing the debt intended to signal that the Soviets would be
reliable members of the international community and good faith trade
partners despite theoretical squabbles with the West. For the following
fifteen years, while the Soviet Union publicly espoused Korovin's
position-arguing that the debt was not legally binding on the USSR, as it
was carried out contrary to the wishes of the proletarian class-Soviet
diplomats privately emphasized that the debt would be settled and that the
USSR would fully comply with all international obligations. 75
On November 16, 1933, the Soviet state publicly agreed to repay the
debt in exchange for recognition by the U.S. and being allowed to join the
League of Nations. To save face and maintain theoretical consistency, the
debt settlement agreement between President Roosevelt and the USSR
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov did not expressly
stipulate that the USSR would repay debt incurred by the Kerensky
government. Rather, the agreement employed a creative legal device
(which came to be known as the Litvinov Assignment). The USSR would
pay $9 million in pre-inflation money to the United States in exchange for
an assignment of all claims, including those due it as the successor of prior
governments of Russia, "on condition that it be notified of any recovery by
the United States on such claims. 76
Why did the USSR agree to repay the obligation when most historians
agree that it could have chosen not to recognize the debt?77 Unclassified
diplomatic dispatches between then-U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Joseph
78Davies and the U.S. State Department shed light upon the matter. On the
topic of debt owed to the United States, Ambassador Davies stressed the
symbolic significance to the Russians of repayment. The amount of the
loan itself was, in the words of Davies,
74. Interest was paid on the remaining three installments of the bond certificates on July 10,
1918, January 10, 1919, and July 10, 1920. Id. at 326. Interest was also paid on the bearer bond
coupons due on June 1, 1918, December 1, 1918, and June 1, 1918 [sic]. Id.
75. U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to Political Relations Between the United States
and the Soviet Union, The National Archives of the United States 1934 [Cornell Library Microfilm,
Film 5863, Roll 1] (containing diplomatic dispatches from Joseph Davies, U.S. Ambassador to the
Soviet Union) [hereinafter Davies].
76. Carl Marks & Co., 665 F. Supp. at 326-27. For a discussion of similar claims against the
Soviets, see Alexander Nahum Sack, Diplomatic Claims Against the Soviets (1918 1938), N.Y.U.
LAW Q. REv. 507 (1938).
77. The amount of the indebtedness was approximately $200 million in 1933 dollars (when it
was settled for $9 million). The original amount was approximately $75 million from two issues. It
was held in bearer bonds and credit participation certificates.
78. See Davies, supra note 75.
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of relative unimportance of the matter to the United States and the
supreme importance to the Russian people of having in the future a
body of liberal public opinion in the United States sympathetic to
the Russian people, particularly in view of the uncertain
international situation [the threat of war] . 9
Indeed, since by the early 1930s the Soviet Union began to seriously
contemplate the threat from fascist regimes; paying off the minor debt in
an effort to curry favor with the significantly more powerful U.S.
government seemed to have been a reasonable step toward balancing the
deteriorating relationship with Germany. This was all the more true
because by 1933, Stalin's position was sufficiently entrenched to the
extent that he would not really lose political capital domestically for
settling the debt issue. In any event, it is clear from the negotiations that
"it was a serious matter to [Russia] to retain the confidence of the [U.S.]
government in the performance of the [debt settlement] agreement .... "so
One can surmise several other likely motivations. First, Soviet leaders
began to realize the immense economic potential of trading with the U.S.
and other developed countries in order to further accelerate
industrialization. Second, with Soviet acquisition of Ford automobile and
tractor manufacturing plants, metal refineries, and general technical know-
how, measurable progress in the manufacturing sector meant moving away
from the status of a raw material exporter. The Soviets thereby improved
global standing and gave greater support to the possibility of "socialism in
one country." 81
The subjective element in the debt negotiations should also be noted.
As Davies remarked, the Soviet diplomats went out of their way to
impress upon him (with personal guarantees and gestures) that the Soviet
Union would pay the debt. Likewise, Davies, in both his official and
personal capacities, made a great deal of the humanitarian similarities
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In his words:
[The U.S.] did have a great body of humanitarian democratic
thought which did have great influence upon world opinion among
liberal minded men everywhere which might be of inestimable
79. Id. at 15.
80. Id. at 63-64.
81. Of the over 2,500 treaties that Soviet Russia concluded during the first forty year period of its
existence (1917 1957), the majority concerned economic problems and questions, chiefly matters of
trade and commerce. See JAN F. TRISKA & ROBERT M. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF
SOVIET TREATIES 4-5 (1962) (providing an excellent overview of Soviet treaty practice during early
Soviet period).
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value to Russia at some point in the future; and that speaking as a
friend of the humanitarian impulses and purposes of the Russian
people, personally I felt compelled to say that in my opinion it
would be a great pity if a cloud were to be permitted by the Soviet
government to dim the confidence which my government might
have in the integrity and character of the men who were running
affairs here; that this was particularly true in my opinion because
there was no leadership of any of the great nations of the earth that
viewed with as much sympathy the fundamental humanitarian
purposes of the Russian people to the degree that President
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull did; that it would be too bad if
a condition were to be permitted by the Soviet government to exist
which would dampen or destroy their confidence in the integrity of
leadership; that financial credits and business considerations in
importance faded into nothing in contrast with this matter of the
principle involved. [The Soviet Union] is producing enormous
agricultural and mineral wealth annually, and it will not be
dependent upon import or export for many years to come. .... While
there is no question but what, in its present phase, its efficiency
cannot compare with capitalist states and possibly never will,
nevertheless, in the absence of competition or necessity for
competition with capitalist states, such inefficiencies need not and
will not appear.8 2
From the Soviet side, Marshal of the USSR and staunch Stalin ally
Kliment Voroshilov 83 agreed that the financial amount involved "was
relatively small" and urged to settle the matter on "big broad, general
principles and that a way should be found, that he appreciated the
greatness of the President of the United States. '84 Aside from subjective
factors, 85 Voroshilov and Litvinov's desire to see the debt matter settled on
82. Davies, supra note 75, at 64.
83. Voroshilov was appointed People's Commissar for Military and Navy Affairs and Chairman
of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a post he held until 1934, when he was elevated to
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
84. Davies, supra note 75, at 64 (Moscow, February 18, 1937-Dispatch No. 68 [Ambassador
Davies to Secretary of State Hull]).
85. There are many such factors in the diplomatic notes, and they call for a critical
reexamination, both generally, as well as part of a "rehabilitation," so-to-speak, of Davies who was
branded "too soft" on the Communists by critics. For instance, it is noteworthy to observe the near-
obsequiousness of the Soviet leaders in their interactions with Davies. In one example, President
Kalinin warned Ambassador Davies of superficial snap judgments of Russia, "A visitor might see
some drunkenness on the streets of Moscow and therefore draw the conclusion that all Russians are
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"broad principles" was highly consistent with the body of Soviet treaty
practice that had developed by that time. This can be summarized as
follows:
(1) Protection of foreign property rights in the USSR via bilateral
trade agreements;
(2) Diplomatic assurances that the USSR treated investment and
property claims as apolitical "administrative" issues governed by
private international law;
(3) Increasing emphasis that competition with "bourgeois" states
was a matter of ideological difference, rather than an actual political
posture.
86
Of the three, the most important vehicle for the promotion of foreign trade
was projecting a predictable treaty regime. But demonstrating the strength
of domestic property rights regimes and enforcement mechanisms was a
close corollary.
Korovin wrote extensively on this subject in his treatises and journal
articles.87 In his International Law of the Transition Period, for instance,
he emphasized that treaties were the sole source of international law and
were sacrosanct in Soviet practice (though not in theory). 88 In his 1927
article on treaties, he explained that treaties formed a backbone of Soviet
foreign practice and were inviolable, save to further advance the cause of
communism. 89 The Soviet diplomatic corps was instructed to emphasize
that the Soviet Union, in addition to rejecting secret diplomacy, had never
violated a single treaty. Aside from projecting a predictable treaty regime
and respect for international norms to attract investment, the Soviet Union
also incorporated international customary and conventional law on the
drunkards, which, of course, was not the fact." Id. at 28 (Moscow, Jan. 25, 1937 Dispatch No. 11
[Ambassador Davies to Secretary of State Hull]).
86. See id at 103 05 (Moscow, Mar. 12, 1937 Dispatch No. 116 [Ambassador Davies to
Secretary of State Hull, titled "Russian Industy How It Works and Why"]) (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., E.A. KOpOBHH, K nepec'vwompy "KenecKoii Konernfuu," 15(3) COBETCKOE
FJPABO 52 (1925) [Evgeny A. Korovin, Reexamination of the Geneva Convention, 15(3) SOVIET LAW
52 (1925)].
88. E.A. KOpOBHH, Oeoopia rebus sic stantibus 6 medfc6yapocrnoh npaKmune P.C. I.C.P., 6(3)
COBETCKOE FJPABO 53 (1922) [E.A. Korovin, The Principle Rebus Sic Stantibus in International
Practice of the RSFSR, 6(3) SOVIET LAW 53 (1922)] (upholding the classic conception of rebus sic
stantibus principle and doctrine of necessity for violating positive treaty obligations).
89. E.A. KopOB1HN, Co~emccue 6,O060pbl u me.oOcyuapoi~oe npa~o 30(6) COBETCKOE FJPABO
91 (1927) [Evgeny A. Korovin, Soviet Treaties and International Lai, 30(6) SOVIET LAW 91 (1927)].
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protection of property in its domestic legislation. This issue is central to
the present vertical harmonization analysis.
2. The Dilemma of Reconciling Communism, NEP & IP
Attracting and protecting foreign trade in the Soviet Union necessarily
required the adoption of domestic laws to protect property, since without
security, Western firms simply would not invest in Russia. 90 Korovin and
subsequent Soviet authors treated the protection of property under
international law as questions of international administrative law, as
apolitical issues on which cooperation with the West was not only
permissible, but encouraged. 91 Notwithstanding the centrality of property
rights to domestic legal battles and theoretical debates, international
protection of property rights, as in the case of intellectual property, was
seen by Soviet theorists as a foreign policy issue, and hence subordinate to
more pressing foreign trade-related policy discussions. For instance,
despite not adhering to the Berne Convention of 188692 or the revision to
the treaty signed at Berlin in 1908,93 the early Soviet state took
tremendous pains to signify its protection of foreigners' copyright, patents,
and trademarks. This was done principally by harmonizing Soviet
domestic legislation with international customary and conventional law-
tantamount to participating in the given treaty bodies, without actually
90. See, e.g., H.B. MHPOHOB, HIPABOBOE PEFYJIPOBAHE BHEIIJHHX CHOULEHHI4 CCCP (1917-
1970) 275 n.29 (HMO, 1971) [NIKOLAI V. MIRONOv, LEGAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE USSR (1917 1970) 275 n.29 (IMO 1971)] (discussing a decree issued by the NKID on May 23,
1919, "[o]n the Prohibition of Protection of Property of Foreigners from States Which Have Severed
Diplomatic Relations with RSFSR"); H. BEPHILITEHiH, B. JIAH)JAY, B. MAIIIKEBHq, HPABOBbIE
YCJIOBH3I KOHLIECCHOHHOfi }EIIEbHOCTH B CCCP 26-47 (M: 1930) [I. BERNSTEIN, B. LANDAU &
V. MASHKEVICH, LEGAL CONDITIONS OF CONCESSIONS IN THE USSR 26-47 (M: 1930)].
91. See KOROVIN, CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 98 102. It is curious that
Western legal historians have not focused more on this aspect of Soviet law and the contradictions
between Marxist conceptions of private property, Lenin's formulation of state capitalism, and Stalin's
foreign trade relations policy. It seems the contradiction concerning property and Soviet trade and
concessions with Western firms was much more fertile soil for pointing out contradictions in Soviet
theory and practice than revisiting the abstract debates concerning the nature of law.
92. The Berne Convention removed registration requirements to trigger copyright protection, and
codified continental conceptions of moral rights. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Paris Act, arts. 2-3, 6 bis, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Sept. 28, 1979);
TARACOUZIO, supra note 43, at 154 n.93. The United States opposed the Berne Convention because of
the removal of registration requirements. By contrast, as indicated above, the USSR removed domestic
registration requirements, without formally acceding to the Berne Convention.
93. See TARACOUZIO, supra note 43, at 154 n.93.
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doing so.94 We can trace this process by observing the evolution of Soviet
domestic legislation on authors' rights.
Authors' Rights. Between 1924 and 1931, there were almost yearly
radical changes to the IP regulatory framework and the administrative
organs charged with implementing the laws.95 The earliest Soviet law
concerning authors' rights and patent rights was a decree in 1917
nationalizing all such rights "in the interest of government,, 96 with limited
protection for the authors. Pursuant to this decree, the duration of authors'
rights was limited to six months, after which all rights reverted to the
state .97
Ivan Peretersky, writing in the journal Sovetskoe Pravo, analyzed these
domestic legislative changes in the field of authors' rights following the
Bolshevik revolution.98 What is immediately striking regarding these
reforms was that they occurred so soon after the revolution. The first
proposed decree on authors' rights was issued on December 6, 1917, just
one month after the Bolsheviks gained control. 99 Pursuant to this proposal,
the length of the protected term was reduced to fifteen years, followed by a
five-year period where the copyright °° was held by the state if the
People's Commissariat of Enlightenment found it to have aesthetic or
scientific value.10 1 The proposal was not adopted. Instead, an even more
restrictive regime was adopted by decree on December 29, 1917,
monopolizing authors' rights in favor of the state for a period of five
years.10 2 Furthermore, on June 11, 1918, a decree was issued on the
abolition of the inheritance of authors' rights, except in the case of heirs
below the age of majority or incapable of working (nempyOocnoco6nbe
94. This strategy is remarkably similar to the IP reform efforts of the Russian Federation to
comply with TRIPS throughout the 2000s without being a signatory or member of the WTO, an issue
that will be discussed infra.
95. FaimHa BHTaibeBHa JOBFaHb, Cucmeva ,ocyoapcm6eH~blX opeaHo6 u ojutecmeHbX
opManu3aluu e ctbepe u3o6pemame.4bcmaa 6 YCCP (1924-1931 rr.) [Galina V. Dovgan', System of
State Organs and Social Organizations in the Sphere of Patent Protection in the Ukrainian SSR
(1924 1931)], available at http://www.lomonosov-msu.ru/archive/Lomonosov 2008/28 4.pdf.
96. John N. Hazard, Notes on Economic Lau, (Prof. Amfitiatrov, 1936) at 90 (Manuscript
Collection, Columbia University Libraries, Bakhmeteff Archive).
97. Id.
98. H. HepeTepcKHfi, 3aOaqu CoeemcKoo 3aKonoame7bcm6a 6 ojiacmu a6mopcmo 'o npa6a,
4(1) COBETCKOE IJPABO 92 (1923) [I. Peretersky, Goals of Soviet Legislation in the Field of Author's
Rights, 4(1) SOVIET LAW 92 (1923)].
99. Id. at 92.
100. I shall use the terms "copyright" and "author's rights" interchangeably. The term "author's
rights" is the preferred term in the Soviet literature (as well as in continental jurisprudence more
generally), but the concepts and legal ramifications are identical.
101. Peretersky, supra note 98, at 92.
102. Id.
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[disabled])." 3 Shortly thereafter, on November 26, 1918, another decree
was issued "nationalizing scientific, literary and artistic works,"
' 10 4
remaining in force until 1923.
Pursuant to this decree, any work (published or unpublished) could be
claimed by the state as its property.10 5 The relevant state agency then had
the right to publication, reproduction, and public exhibition of the work.1
0 6
The author was entitled to an honorarium, and in the case of minor
children, remainder rights could be paid out to the heirs from the proceeds
of the work.10 7 The author's right expired six months after death.108
Interestingly, in regulations promulgated by the People's Commissariat on
Enlightenment on February 9, 1919, the old fifty-year terms were used for
works created prior to the nationalization, or specifically, June 1, 1919.09
These conflicting decrees were systematically reworked following the
introduction of NEP, not only to protect domestic authors, but also to
incorporate international protections for the defense of foreign authors.
Peretersky indicates that more than one year went into the drafting of the
new law on authors' rights. 10 This new law was intended to be a departure
from the Russian Imperial Code of 1911, both in substance and spirit, but
Peretersky's account points to tension within the Institute of Soviet Law in
the drafting of the new code.' First, much like American opposition to
the Berne Convention on the basis of moral rights, drafters had difficulty
conceptualizing precisely what was being protected-whether it was the
abstract "spiritualized" right of the author to his or her creation or the
work product of this spiritual, "psychological" process.1 2 Moreover, there
were proposals to discard this distinction, as well as the distinction
between authors' rights and patents over physical inventions, in favor of a
broad principle protecting quite simply, products of labor, consistent with
Marxist ideology. 13 After discussing at length the legal distinction
between patents and authors' rights, Peretersky conceded the need for
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Peretersky, supra note 98, at 92.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 93. In addition, by decree dated August 16, 1921, all textbooks were to be published by
the state publishing house FocH3,jaT (Gosizdat). Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at93 94.
112. Peretersky, supra note 98, at 93-94.
113. Id. at94.
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different terms and legal protection regimes, though the goal, in principle,
was a single unitary system.1
4
Peretersky's Marxist critique of copyright law illuminates how Soviet
theorists balanced individual versus (what they considered) new social
rights.1 5 According to Peretersky, the state had rights to the given work
because the actual creator of the work was not merely the individual
author, but also the social medium in which he or she worked. 1 6 Next,
since copyright, like all law, was not a logical but a historical construct,
copyright law had to take into account relevant economic relations of
production and the social utility of given works.'' However, it is
remarkable to observe the workings of the NEP and the hold of the
capitalist mindset, as Peretersky concludes that defense of authors' rights
was necessary to protect the incentives for the creation of works-a
proposition completely incompatible with Marxist thought." 8 Thus,
Peretersky proposed reintroduction of all Imperial-era rights, such as the
author's right to prevent alteration of his or her "mental child," the right of
reproduction, and the right of compensation for takings." 9 To the extent
that the government retained rights, these had to be limited so that the state
could not seize works for commercial benefit. 20 With respect to the
objects of copyright, Peretersky suggested sweeping categories, including
traditional works, but also new works stemming from the introduction of
film (Peretersky suggested copyright over plotlines to films, whether they
were written or not).121 Lastly, Peretersky suggested the introduction of a
uniform template publication agreement (between publishers and authors)
modeled on the Swiss contract code of 1911, subjecting publication
contracts to the statute of frauds.
1 22
Peretersky's discussion elided conflicts of laws issues and international
treaties, but these became major points of contention in subsequent
writings. With economic growth came the decree of 1925, which
established longer duration terms,123 but maintained the widest possible
114. Id.
115. Id. at 95.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 94-95.
118. Peretersky, supra note 98, at 95.
119. Id. at 96.
120. Id. at 97.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 99.
123. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 5, at xiv
Xv.
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state use and public use exceptions, such as translation of foreign works
without compensation.
124
Furthermore, the Soviet Union took a favorable position on the Berne
Convention (continuing the Imperial legacy). 125 The Berne treaty regime
was affirmed in bilateral treaties with a number of European states. For
example, the Soviet-German treaty "on the defense of industrial property"
dated October 12, 1925 required the USSR to apply German law and IP
protections in dealings with German citizens and firms. 126 Despite
recognizing the Berne protections, the Soviet Union entered into a number
of separate agreements where the USSR claimed broad state-use
exemptions in the "use of the technical and cultural heritage of the West,"
which Korovin justified by reference to the "[Soviet] material and cultural
paucity." 121
The 1925 set of fundamental principles on authors' rights was
expanded in 1928, and ultimately codified in the Law on Author's Rights
of October 8, 1928. Pursuant to this law, the author's right expanded from
25 years from the date of publication or presentation, to the life of the
author, plus fifteen years after the author's death. In the opinion of Soviet
jurists, these copyright terms were entirely consistent with international
norms. 128  Soviet jurists were of the same opinion on the related
harmonization process with respect to trademarks and patents. 
29
In fact, by 1935, Pashukanis dropped any opposition to international
conventions for the defense of industrial or property rights.130 In formalist
fashion, he wrote about the International Council for the Defense of
124. Hazard, supra note 96, at 90.
125. KOROVIN, CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 91, at 100.
126. Id. at 99.
127. Id. at 100.
128. Id.
129. NEP and post-NEP Soviet legislation fully protected domestic and foreign trademarks in
accordance with bilateral and general principles outlined in international agreements. Writing on
trademarks in 1924, S.I. Raevich began his article with a note on how "fortunate" it was that
trademarks received sufficient legislative attention both during the period of war communism and the
NEP and remarked how consistent Soviet patent legislation was with European standards. C.H.
PaeBnq, 0 mo~apnbIx MnaKax no coeemcKzo.y npaey, 12(6) COBETCKOE IIPABO 64 (1924) [S.I.
Raevich, On Trademarks in Soviet Law, 12(6) SOVIET LAW 64 (1924)]. With the adoption of the law
"On Patents on Inventions" in 1924, the committee on inventions under the Supreme Soviet of the
National Economy (BCHX CCCP) continued functioning, but its prerogative was greatly restricted to
issuing applications, licenses for the use of models, shop drawings and trademarks. Dovgan', supra
note 95, at 1. The patent system introduced in 1924 created a patent bureau and required users to
obtain permission of the patent owner prior to using the invention. Id. (citing BCHX CCCP No1 1 Oi
25.11.1925).
130. E. HALIYKAHHC, OqEPKH HO ME)K)JYHAPOJHOMY FIPABY 165-66 (Foc. H3J. COB.
3acoHojaTeJIbCTBO, 1935) [E. PASHUKANIS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 66 (State Publ.
Soviet Jurisprudence 1935)].
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Industrial Property rights founded in Berne in 1883 (pursuant to the 1883
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property).1 31 To
Pashukanis, these "special questions of international law" and
international administrative unions were to be analyzed based on a
concrete estimate of their expected utility.1 32 He saw no danger or conflict
between these special treaty bodies and overarching Soviet principles, so
long as they did not signify the wholesale adoption of bourgeois systems
or conflation into the League of Nations apparatus.
133
Whereas to the early Pashukanis, the debate over property concerned
the basic form/substance distinction and the legal notion of property
(including socialist property concepts in Soviet law) was but a sham for
what was in essence bourgeois law, 134 by the late 1920s scholars like
Korovin succeeded in showing that it was permissible to use seemingly
bourgeois constructs during the transition stage to communism. Both
Korovin and Pashukanis reconciled the seeming contradiction between
intellectual property protection and Marxist theory by situating both in a
broader international law and foreign policy context. Whereas lesser
figures like Dotsenko continued to struggle to create a theoretical
distinction between private property and personal property-where private
property was deemed to be that which was acquired as a result of
commercial enterprise (as for instance, under NEP), and personal property
was that acquired as a result of work in a communal enterprise (such as the
Kolkhoz) 135  Korovin's notion of the transition theory and
instrumentalism obviated the need to ground intellectual property
discussions in more fundamentally theoretical terms. To put it another
way, protecting intellectual property rights was indispensable to attract
trade, and trade was indispensable to strengthening the Soviet state;
likewise, whatever was necessary to strengthen the Soviet state was
consistent with Marxist-Leninist tenets. This position was solidly endorsed
by Pashukanis' successor, Andrey Vyshinsky,1 36 and continued to serve as
131. Id.
132. Id. at 165.
133. Pashukanis observed that Article 24 of the Statute of the League subordinated existing treaty
bodies to the League. Id. at 164 65. However, aside from the expressed desire to see these bodies
separate, Pashukanis offers no discussion of the interaction of the various administrative organs and
the League.
134. See generally PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY, supra note 6.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Michael Head, The Passionate Legal Debates of the Early Years of the Russian Revolution,
14 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 27 (2001) (discussing Vyshinsky's arguments in defense of law and
"stability of laws" by reference to property rights: "[Vyshinsky's examples of the need for law] all
concerned the protection of private property interests. 'To reduce law to policy would be to ignore
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the basis for the Soviet "stability of laws" doctrine for the remainder of the
Soviet Union.
C. Late Soviet IP Protection: An Overview
Having discussed the centrality of the property rights and vertical
harmonization debates in the creation of the early Soviet state, it is
worthwhile to explore the late or "classic" Soviet treatment of IP law. This
section provides an overview of this phase of the Soviet IP regime,
including the USSR's participation in international conventions
concerning intellectual property.
In the domestic realm, Soviet copyright law resembled European civil
law authors' rights protections, with a major distinction being the goal of
the law. From the Soviet perspective, Soviet copyright law sought to
balance the rights between authors and "society," whereas Western law
was seen as being unfavorably biased towards publishers against
authors. 3 ' However, despite this rhetorical position, Western
commentators writing on Soviet copyright law stressed the similarities to
European regimes. Western comparativists routinely remarked on the
Soviet's relatively unremarkable, and even "unexciting,', 38 distinctions
with respect to Western copyright law, contrary to what one would expect
from a socialist state. Unlike Cuba's complete disavowal of copyright law
in the 1960s, 139 for instance, the Soviet Union fully ascribed to reigning
international obligations throughout its existence (whether by conforming
domestic law to international standards, or by joining the relevant treaties).
On the international plane, the Soviet Union was a state party to the
three principal conventions relating to authors' rights from the mid-1970s:
the Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as
amended in 1971; the Universal Copyright Convention ("UCC") as
amended in 1971140 (the USSR ratified the UCC in 1973); and the 1971
such tasks confronting law as that of the legal defense of personal, property, family and inheritance
rights and interests, and the like."').
137. Dietrich A. Loeber, "Socialist" Features of Soviet Copyright Lair, 23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNATL L. 297 98 (1985) [hereinafter Loeber] (offering an excellent introduction to Soviet
copyright law).
138. Id. at298 302.
139. Id. at 302 03 (quoting Fidel Castro Speaks, 214, 218 (1969)). Cf Ley No. 14 de 28 de
diciembre de 1977, Ley del Derecho de Autor, available at http://www.cenda.cu/php/loader.php?cont
-legis.php&tipo-2 (harmonizing Cuban copyright law with international standards).
140. Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971, with Appendix
Declaration relating to Article XVII and Resolution concerning Article XI 1971, July 24, 1971,
available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/.
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Convention on Protection of the Interests of Producers of Phonograms
Against the Illegal Reproduction of their Phonograms. The major legal
maneuver exercised by the USSR concerned its accession to the UCC in
1973. The Soviet Union adopted the UCC before the 1971 Paris
amendments to the UCC went into force,1 41 so as to avoid the 1971
amendments which gave authors greater exclusive rights to their work and
significantly restricted legal licenses.1
42
On February 21, 1973, six days before the USSR deposited its
declaration of accession to the UCC, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR enacted a series of amendments to chapter IV of the 1961
Fundamentals to bring the Soviet copyright law in line with the minimum
requirements the UCC imposed.1 43 Ultimately, in 1978 the USSR acceded
to the Paris amendments, subject to a reservation granting liberal use of
Soviet works by developing countries. The political justification for the
USSR acceding to the treaties was explained in a separate letter (1978)
from the USSR to the treaty body:
Desirous of helping to create favorable conditions for the use of the
works of Soviet authors by the developing countries for educational
purposes, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the
application of the aforementioned Convention to the works of
Soviets [sic] authors. 44
With its accession to the UCC, scholars observed that a seemingly dual
system of copyright law emerged. For works published by domestic
authors (or works by foreigners which were first published on USSR
territory), the Soviet copyright legislation applied. On the other hand,
international law governed copyright rights for foreign works. As analyzed
by Michiel Elst, the consequences of this dual system of copyright were
felt particularly in the limitations of copyright.4 5 Thus, domestic authors'
rights were subject to the most far-reaching free uses and legal licenses,
141. See ELST, supra note 5, at 82 n.147.
142. Id. An amendment made at the Paris diplomatic conference in 1971 pertained to Article VI
his (1) & (2) relating to reproduction, public use, and transmission of works by radio. See M.M.
BOGUSLAVSKII, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE SOVIET APPROACH 173 (William Simons trans.,
1988); see also Records of the Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention:
Unesco House, Paris, 5 to 24 July 1971 (Unesco 1973).
143. See ELST, supra note 5, at 82 83.
144. Supra note 140 (Universal Copyright Convention, with Appendix Declaration relating to
Articles XVII and Resolution concerning Article XI 1952, UNESCO Convention Documents, Protocol
2 (letter from the USSR dated August 24, 1978)).
145. ELST, supra note 5, at 95.
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whereas those who fell within the purview of the UCC enjoyed broader
protection.
This dual system had noticeable practical effects. For instance, if a
musical work of a Soviet writer was publicly performed, it could be freely
reproduced in a film or freely broadcast on radio and television. On the
contrary, public performance of a work by a foreign author did not subject
the author to the free use exemptions or legal licenses of Soviet law: the
author's permission was required1 46 because the extent of fair use/legal
license use in the domestic context was quite broad,1 47 especially for
educational or scientific purposes. 4 8 However, with the Soviet state often
the copyright holder, and in many instances the ostensible copyright
encroacher, copyright issues in the domestic arena were mostly moot. 149
With respect to traditional copyright protection issues (length of term,
etc.), Soviet domestic implementation of the UCC was consistent with
international standards. 150 The term of protection was twenty-five years
after the death of the author with remainder rights paid out to heirs, much
like in capitalist states.1
51
Elst correctly notes that the foreign-domestic duality in Soviet
copyright law was untenable. However, when Soviet jurists recognized
this discrepancy, their solution was to simply adapt the much broader free
use standards found in Soviet copyright law to international law, and not
vice versa.152 In other words, consistent with the USSR's political and
cultural policy, reconciling "fair use" between Soviet law and international
norms often meant adopting the wider fair use exemptions. For purposes
of the present analysis, this can be rephrased as rejection of vertical
harmonization. By insisting on its own legal standards, the Soviet Union
146. See id. at 95 99.
147. Id. It was also expanded domestically in 1973 to permit newspapers to reproduce any
published report or scientific, artistic, literary, or oral work; either in the original or as a translation.
MICHAEL A. NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION 110 (Praeger 1978). This was used
famously by Soviet literary journals to publish translations of Vonnegut's Breakfast of Champions and
Norman Mailer's Marylin. Due to highly-publicized protests from the West, the Soviet Union bought
publishing rights to the works shortly thereafter. Id. at 111 12.
148. NEWCITY, supra note 147, at 112.
149. SERGE L. LEVITSKY, COPYRIGHT, DEFAMATION, AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET CIVIL LAW: DE
LEGE LATA Ac FERENDA, No. 22(l): LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE 420 21 (Martinus Nijhoff 1979)
(listing instances where copyright claims could not be invoked against the state pursuant to Soviet civil
law limitations despite being enumerated as fundamental constitutional or traditional author's rights).
150. Loeber, supra note 137, at 299 300.
151. Id. at 300 ("As to the property rights of the deceased-the royalties-comparative lawyers
would expect some 'socialist impact on the law, such as the denial of monetary benefits to an heir on
the grounds that these would accrue to him as 'unearned income.' Soviet law, however, stops short of
imposing such a limitation and conforms in this respect to capitalist practices.").
152. ELST, supra note 5, at 101.
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was maintaining an exceptionalist posture on the issue of broad fair use
protections.
With respect to actual enforcement of copyright claims against the
Soviet Union, it should be noted that very few claims (foreign or
domestic) actually proceeded through the Soviet judiciary. Peter Maggs, in
his introduction to the copyright volume of Soviet Statutes and Decisions,
explained that this was due to the realities and context of state
publishing. 153 The limitation on who could actually publish authors' works
and control the revenues and royalties indeed presented a serious
limitation on the free exercise of rights, although some transfers did
occur.
154 Moreover, in the domestic context, copyright infringement claims
were limited by the remedies available to aggrieved parties through Soviet
civil, labor, and administrative law, representing the interplay between the
three major characteristics of the Soviet system: socialist property,
155
economic planning, and the leading role of the Communist Party. With
respect to foreign claims, interpretation of obligations arising under
international treaties was rare due to the small number of potential
disputes involving foreign claimants.
By the mid-1980s, advances in technology required the modernization
of Soviet IP law (as in other countries) to reflect the challenge posed by
new digital reproduction technologies. During this time, like most legal
systems, the Soviet system only sporadically investigated the challenges
posed to copyright by technical advances.
156
II. RUSSIAN IP LAW (1992-2006): TRANSITION
A. Change, Transplants, and Harmonization
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's IP regime underwent a
radical series of transformations. Generally speaking, they can be divided
into three periods. The first, lasting from 1992 to 1994, was a period of
indigenous change with law reform proposals originating from working
groups established in the dying days of the USSR. The second period,
153. Loeber, supra note 137, at 312 (citing 14 SOVIET STATUTES AND DECISIONS 5 (P.B. Maggs
ed., 1977 78)).
154. Id. at 303 12.
155. Id.
156. ELST, supra note 5, at 109.
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roughly from 1995 to 2006, was a period of legal transplantation157 and
vertical harmonization.' 58 Here, vertical harmonization characterizes the
relationship between Russia and international trade bodies like the WTO,
as well as the perception of more diffuse norms or general principles of
international law.1 59 This period is notable because it coincided with what
Gianmaria Ajani identified as the second stage of transition and law
reform in Russia, "marked by a more critical approach towards 'paper
laws' and by a more conscious attitude towards the 'Anglo-American
thinking' of legal advisers and of international financial institutions."
160
Because IP reform in Russia followed other reforms, this period may also
reveal how Russian policymakers internalized the lessons of preceding
reforms in other substantive fields, if at all. Lastly, the third period of IP
reform corresponds to the adoption of Part IV of the Russian Civil Code
on November 24, 2006 (effective January 1, 2008), intended to supersede
all previous legislation relating to intellectual property and to bring
Russian law into compliance with international obligations.
Scholars have chronicled the evolution of Russia's IP regime in
exceedingly detailed accounts, 16 1 so there is no need to retell the reform
process, save but in general strokes. As a state successor to the USSR, the
Russian Federation remained a state party to each of the treaties discussed
above. 62 Aside from inheriting Soviet treaty obligations, the Russian
Federation was also heir to a new Soviet intellectual property law which
was to go into effect in the USSR on January 1, 1992, but actually went
into force in the new Russian Federation on August 3, 1992. This
157. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974);
Gianmaria Aj ani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J.
COMp. L. 93, 93 n.1 (1995).
158. Peter Maggs, The Process of Codification in Russia. Lessons Learned from the Uniform
Commercial Code, 44 MCGILL L.J. 281 (1999).
159. See Larry Cata Backer, Introduction and Analysis, in HARMONIZTNG LAW IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, AND RESISTANCE 13-14 (Larry Cat6 Backer ed.,
2007) (discussing vertical integration, and citing the definition of harmonization as the "effect [ol] an
approximation or co-ordination of different legal provisions or systems by eliminating major
differences and crating minimum requirements or standards").
160. Ajani, supra note 157, at 96.
161. See generally ELST, supra note 5.
162. In 1994, Victor Chernomyrdin issued a governmental decree to clarify that Russian
Federation inherited its international treaty obligations with respect to IP. See Russian Federation,
decree no. 1224/1994: 0 npucoecuueuuu PoccuiicKon 'leOepaziuu K tepnCKoh KoH6eUu o6 oxpaue
lumepamyp-bX u xydoomcecrn6enbX npou36oeenu 6 peOcaatuu 1971 -ooa, Bceiupnout KoHet/uu o
amopcKwoV npaee 6 pe~aKicuu 1971 -o~a u Oono.numebubI.V1 HpomoKoiavi 1 u 2, Koneeumuu 1971
-oca o6 oxpane u-inlepeco6 npou36ooumleeh 4boHopamli out He3aKoHno o 6ocnpou3odcmea ux
/onopaivw, November 3, 1994 (Russian) [Governmental decree no. 1224 from 1994, signed by
Viktor Chernomyrdin, Regarding Russia's Accession to the Berne Convention, UCC, and the 1971
Additional Protocols to the UCC], available at http://www.copyrighter.ru/full/index.html?berne4.htm.
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legislation lasted only one year before being replaced by the Law on
Author's Rights and Neighboring Rights, which went into force on August
3, 1993 .t
In a clean break with the Soviet past, the 1993 Russian Constitution
also recognized and protected by law "intellectual property" as an
aggregate of exclusive rights to the results of intellectual activity.164 The
use of the term "intellectual property" versus authors' rights is significant
as it was the first time the term was used in Russian legislation since the
early 1920s. As relevant to the discussion below, the Russian Constitution
also enshrined additional limited guarantees with respect to mass
information. For instance, Article 29(4) provides: "Each shall have the
right to freely seek, receive, transmit, produce, and disseminate
information by any legal means."' 165 Similarly, Article 29(5) provides that
"[t]he freedom of mass information shall be guaranteed." These rights
must be interpreted in light of the copyright law, and vice versa, but
Russian courts have yet to rule on any likely conflicts.
166
Equally important, the 1993 Russian Constitution codified a monist
conception of international law.' 6  Article 15, Section 4 proclaimed that
general principles of international law, customary international norms and
international agreements to which Russia is a party shall henceforth be
constitutive norms of the Russian legal system. 68 Pursuant to the plain
163. WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra
note 5, at xvi; see also id at 15 (providing an English translation of the 1993 law).
164. See Konstitutsiia Russiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 44, available at
http://www.gov.ru/main/konst/konsti html.
165. Id. art 29(4); WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAw 710 (2d ed. 2003) (providing an English
translation of 1993 Russian Constitution).
166. The above provisions respecting freedom of information have been interpreted to refer to the
government's duty to release information. However, as explained fully below, this provision may also
be read more broadly to suggest a protection of the means of access to mass information, such as the
Internet. For instance, such a broad protection may be employed to immunize Russian Internet service
providers from their customers' copyright violations.
167. In the USSR, the relationship of treaties to municipal law was one of the most hotly-
contested issues in international law. One view was that the act of ratification of a treaty by the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was "a special normative act imparting legal force to
international treaty norms." William E. Butler, Comparative Approaches to International Laiv, 190
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 52-53 (1985). Another view held that transformation of national legislation
was necessary before an international treaty became part of municipal law. Id. at 53. Third, according
to Article 21 of the 1978 USSR Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution, and
Denunciation of International Treaties, certain treaties became automatically binding upon
incorporation pursuant to Article 21. Id.
168. Konstitutsiia Russiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [CONSTITUTION], Art. 15, available at http:/
www.gov.ru/main/konst/konstll html ("O6ruenpH3HaHlbe npHHnMb1 Hb O pmb me)K4yHapO HO[O
npaBa H Me)KYaPOHbIe ROrOBOPbI PoccnicKott OeiepaIui ABI IOTCI COCTaBROft qacTIo ee
UpaBOBOft cilcTeMbI. Eciii Me)KFiynapORMbIM jOFOBOPOM PoccnttcKofi O(Ceiepaum ycTaHOBJieHbI HHbIe
npaB"jia, qeM npeayCMOTpeHHble 3aKOHOM, TO npHMeHIOTGIC npaaa MelyHapOJHOFO J OFOBopa."
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language of Article 15, international treaties were elevated higher even
than domestic legislation: under Section 4, if an international convention
contravenes other laws, then the international convention trumps domestic
law.169 Article 15, Section 4 itself did not stipulate whether international
law required national implementation, translation, or transformation, or
whether international treaties are self-implementing. 7 ° Accordingly, the
constitutional provision immediately became the locus of a major debate
in post-Soviet international legal theory.1 71 This debate, by and large, has
continued to the present day.
172
Returning to the copyright law, the 1993 Law on Author's Rights and
Neighboring Rights was not well received by either Russian scholars or
Western observers. While the law recognized individuals' property rights
in cultural and artistic works of their own creation, it considerably reduced
the list of free uses, a longstanding custom in Soviet IP law. Remaining
free uses were defined much more narrowly than before, and compulsory
licenses were abolished altogether. 73 From the West's viewpoint, the 1993
law reform package lacked many of the basic elements found in Western
practice, such as the right to alienate and encumber intellectual property
rights.' 4 Accordingly, the legislative package was quickly tabled for
amendment. Incidentally, this was to have positive consequences, as it
allowed legislators to assess the impact of emerging information
["General principles and norms of international law, and international treaties to which Russian
Federation is a party, are constitutive parts of Russia's legal system. If national law contradicts
international treaties, then international law supersedes national legislation."]).
169. Id.
170. B.B. FaBplJIOB, Teopuu mpanctop.iazmu u une.vienmaltuu nop.M m e)ccynapoino.o npaea
6 omeqecmeenHou npae6o0o0 OoKmpuHe. 2 MOCKOBCKHI )KYPHAJT ME)KIQYHAPOAHOFO YPABA 39-61
(2001) [V.V. Gavrilov, Theories of Transformation and Implementation of International Legal Norms
in Russian Legal Doctrine, 2 MOSCOW J. INTL L. 39, 40 (2001)], available at http://www.law.edu.ru/
article/article.asp?articlelD= 162606.
171. E.T. YCeHKO, Coomnotuenue u 63au4oOeucnue .4e)OyHapoOno2o U Hat/uoHabHo o npaea
u PoccuucKaq KoncmumyquA, 2 MOCKOBCK1I4i )KYPHAJI ME, LCYHAPOHOFO HPABA 16 (1995) [E.T.
Usenko, Correlation and Interrelationship of International and Domestic Lan, and the Russian
Constitution, 2 Moscow J. INT'L L. 16 (1995)]; B.B. FaBPwIOB, Teopuu npaHcpopmaitu u
uvne.vieumajuu nopm ,viewcbyuapo6noo npa~a 6 omeiecmennoi npaeo~ou ooKmpune. 2
MOCKOBCKHIH )KYPHAl ME)K, YHAPO}IHOFO HPABA 39, 39 61 (2001) [Gavrilov, supra note 170, at
39-61.
172. See K.N. Ratsiborinskaia, Application of International Law by Russian Courts, in RUSSIAN
LAW: THEORY & PRACTICE 59 (2004); O.A. Ishchenko & E.G. Ishchenko, Implementation of
International Law in Russian Legislation, 2 RUSSIAN LAW: THEORY & PRACTICE 196 (2008); L.L.
Ponomareva, International Law in Decisions of Russian Criminal Courts, I RUSSIAN LAW: THEORY &
PRACTICE 52, 55 59 (2008) (discussing the Surgut District Court's failure to consider international
standards and extradition rules, and proposing legislative changes to require courts to explain
analytical process in court decisions).
173. ELST, supra note 5, at 370-75.
174. Id.
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technologies and to compare similar reform projects then being proposed
in various jurisdictions, as well as internationally.
The Russian civil code was incrementally amended in 1995 and 2004
to further conform Russian domestic law with evolving TRIPS 175 and
bilateral obligations.1 76 Generally speaking, the 1995 and 2004 reforms
kept with longstanding Soviet practice and the civil law tradition. Rights
were based on the moral theory of authors' rights; that is, an author has
exclusive rights to use his works, including the rights of reproduction,
distribution, "communication to the general public by cable," and others
(all referred to as the "property rights"). The copyright law applied broadly
to any work, whether technical, artistic, or of another nature, and also to
all reproducible media.1 77 The 2006 reform also added to the list of
exclusive rights an "Internet right" 78 -that is, the right of
"communication of a work in such a way that it is accessible for any
person in the interactive mode from any place and at any time at his choice
(right of making available to the general public)."'179 A limited fair use
exemption was provided in Articles 20-24 covering traditional cultural,
educational, and scientific uses.18° Part IV of the Russian Civil Code was
adopted in 2006 and became effective on January 1, 2008.
These reforms were meant to be evolutionary and to gradually
modernize and bring Russian law in line with international norms.
175. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
176. Sergey Budylin & Yulia Osipova, Is AlloJIP3 Legal? Non-Contractual Licensing under
Russian Copyright Law, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 3 n. 16 (2007).
177. In addition to the General Law on Author's Rights, there also exists a 1992 Law on the Legal
Protection of Programs of Electronic Computers and Data Bases (as amended 24 December, 2004).
See WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note 5, at
xxii. Pursuant to this law, "[c]omputer programs are treated as works of literature, and data bases, as
collections." Id. The substantive provisions of the law are similar to the Law on Author's Rights. Id. A
Russian Agency for the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, Data Bases, and Topologies of
Integral Microcircuits was formed to register computer programs, data bases, and topologies and
contracts assigning such (pursuant to the 1992 law on Computers and Data Bases, amended in 2004).
Id. at xxii-xxiii. However, it is unclear how many computer programs were or are voluntarily
registered with this agency.
178. In 2006, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued an advisory opinion seeking to
clarify the then-existing copyright law, delineate civil and criminal jurisdiction, procedure and
evidentiary rules, and highlight the need for further reform as a result of challenges posed by the
Internet. See Supreme Court of the Russian Federation: 0 Gonpocax, 6o3uuCuuy y cy~o6 npu
pacc viompeHUU ,pamfcdaHcKux Oe,7, C6313aHHbIX C npuwveHeHue f 3aKoHocarne lbcm6a oo a6lopcKom
npaee u c~e)igcbzy npaaax, Plenum decision no. 15 of June 19, 2006 [On Questions Regarding the
Application of the Copyright Law], available at http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt detale.phpid=4349.
179. See Budylin & Osipova, supra note 176, at 4 (this provision went into effect on September 1,
2006, but has since been superseded by Part IV of the Russian Civil Code).
180. 1993 Law on Author's Rights and Neighboring Rights, Arts. 20 24 (author's translation).
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However, aside from mandatory harmonization required by Article 15(4)
of the Russian Constitution, Russia also sought to voluntarily harmonize
its domestic IP regime with WTO-related IP norms. Yet how did Russia
interpret these obligations? To what extent did Russia succeed in
coordinating its domestic legal regime with TRIPs? These questions can
be analyzed through Russia's evolving conceptions of fair use/free license
in copyright policy. Fair use is a useful analytical frame because it
illustrates where a legal regime strikes the balance between individual
rights to a given work and social or public rights. For instance, if during
Soviet times legal doctrine avoided the term "intellectual property"
altogether-criticizing it "for not only its inaccuracy but for being
bourgeois and exploitative"'8 '-and provided fairly broad fair use
exceptions to copyright, analyzing fair use in the post-Soviet context
elucidates the continuities/changes between Soviet and post-Soviet
sensibilities1 82 towards intellectual property more broadly.
Prior to embarking on the fair use analysis, however, a review is
necessary of the driving forces, both domestic and international, behind
the harmonization reforms.
B. Policy-Driven Harmonization (2000-Present)
Effective January 1, 2008, Russia's entire intellectual property regime
was codified in a new Part IV of the Russian Civil Code. 8 3 The stated
purpose of Russia's new Part TV of the Civil Code ("New Copyright
Law") was to bring Russian copyright law into line with international
copyright norms. 84 The express goal was harmonization of Russia's entire
IP regime-not merely individual normative acts, but the entire regulatory
and enforcement system-with the standards set forth in multilateral
conventions, namely TRIPS, but also other conventions.'85 The law reform
181. William E. Butler, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note
5, at x.
182. "Sensibility" here refers to the opinions of legal scholars and policymakers regarding a given
proposition. Research has revealed no opinion polls or ethnographic data on the topic of intellectual
property rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s from the perspective of Soviet citizens. The
assertions, therefore, are based on logical inferences, doctrinal writings and a small unscientific
opinion sample from Russian colleagues.
183. Alexander L. Makovsky, On the Fourth Part of Russia's Civil Code, in CIVIL CODE OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, FOURTH PART 24 (Peter Maggs & Alexander Makovsky eds., 2008) (offering a
parallel English-Russian translation).
184. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSLISKOI FEDEATSI [GKRF] [Civil Code] pt. 4, available at
http://www.internet-Law.ru/law/kodeks/gk4.htm (Russ.).
185. V.N. Monakhov, Conference Presentation at Moscow State University Faculty of Journalism:
Mass Information in Internet: Freedom and Responsibility (Oct. 12 13, 2007). A draft version of the
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project followed more than ten years of advisory work from the United
States, the WTO and international IP organizations.1 86 The reform project
was championed by a number of domestic actors, such as the Moscow
Media Law and Policy Institute and media industry groups, who sought to
clarify the confusing maze of rights and obligations under previous
legislative enactments. But a foreign lobby also took active part in shaping
the new law. A common overarching political reality for both camps was
that perceived success/failure of the reforms would influence Russia's
accession to the WTO.
1 87
1. WTO, TRIPS & the American Lobby
Russia's long road to WTO membership began almost twenty-five
years ago. Even under the Soviet Union, one of the first steps of the
Gorbachev administration was to apply for membership to the GATT in
August 18, 1986, and to participate in the Uruguay Rounds, both of which
were rejected by the West.' 88 The Russian Federation reapplied for GATT
membership in 1993, one year after the dissolution of the USSR. 1'8 9
present section was presented at the conference. Sample treaties include the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Sept. 9, 1886, last amended 1979), in force in the Russia
Federation since March 13, 1995; Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-
Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (May 21, 1974), in force in Russian Federation since
January 20, 1989; Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source
on Goods (Apr. 14, 1981) (revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6,
1925, at London on June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon on October 31, 1958 and was added to in Stockholm
on July 14, 1967); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Mar. 20, 1883, last
amended 1979), in force in Russian Federation since August 12, 2009; Patent Law Treaty (Sept. 1,
2000), with currently signed parties, in force in Russian Federation since August 12, 2009; Convention
for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their
Phonograms (Oct. 29, 1971), with 80 currently signed parties, in force in the Russian Federation since
March 13, 1995; Rome Convention for the Protection of Perforners, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations (Oct. 26, 1961), in force in Russian Federation since May 26, 2003;
Trademark Law Treaty (Oct. 27, 1994), with 77 signers, and which the Russian Federation signed May
11, 1998; Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (May 26,
1986), the ten signers of which include Zambia, Serbia, Saint Lucia, Liberia, India, Guatemala, Ghana,
Egypt, China, Bosnia and Herzegovina; WIPO Copyright Treaty (Dec. 20, 1996); WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (Dec. 20, 1996).
186. GJIbra FljieImaHoBaI Fpawc~aucKu1 fKeKc paoue c c mpe6oeaHui4u BTO, KoMMepcaHT
(24.07.2006) [Olga Pleshanova, Civil Code Departs from Demands of WTO, Kommersant (July 24,
2006), available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspxDocslD=692256.
187. RUSSIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, CULTURAL
HERITAGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HARMONIZATION OF LAWS, FESTSCHRIFT FOR MARK M.
BOGUSLAVSKIJ (A. Trunk, R. Knieper A.G. & Svetlanov eds., Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2004).
188. KAzIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC
ORDER 187 (1987).
189. Elmira Danelyan, Russia's Long Journey to the WTO: Whose Interests Will Be Served if
Russia Joins the World Club?, 1:4 LANDSLIDE 52, 52 (2009).
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Russia's WTO accession process has been tumultuous, and reflects many
of the broader anxieties about liberalization reforms in Russia over the
past twenty years. This is not the place to delve into the large amount of
literature on Russia and the WTO, 90 but a review of the debate over
TRIPS 191 and IP reform is necessary.
Russia's IP regime first gained widespread global attention around the
late 1990s and early 2000s, when a vocal opposition to Russian piracy,
coupled with lax IP regulation, began to take shape in the West. 192 The
West's criticism had several roots. First, Russia's large, highly educated
and technologically savvy work force (diminished and, perhaps,
emboldened by the "brain drain" of the 1990s) began to use the Internet to
download vast amounts of copyrighted Western-sourced media, including
video games, computer programs, films, music, and electronic books.
Second, around the late 1990s, the rate of high-profile hacking, spamming
and phishing attacks originating from Russia began to multiply
exponentially. These attacks raised public awareness of the danger posed
by emerging technologies, especially in light of the then-impending Y2K
crisis. A third publicized source of tension between America and Russia
was America's allegation that the Russian government was complicit in its
public's obsession with Internet piracy by completely disregarding its
obligations to protect copyright with respect to new and emerging
technologies. 193 This was seen as stemming from weak enforcement
mechanisms, corruption, low penalties, and "lack of education and training
for law enforcement and judicial officials. 194
190. Chiedu Osakwe et al., Russia's Accession to the WTO, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa-
eventDetail&id-1496; see also Jasmine Cameron, WTO Accession and Legal Tradition in the Area of
Intellectual Property Rights: A Comparative Case Study of Kyrgyzstan and Russia, 11 J. EAST
EUROPEAN LAW 1 (2004); Mike Moore, Director-General, World Trade Organization, speech at the
Fifth Annual Russian Economic Forum: Russia and the WTO: Reintegration in the World Economy
(Apr. 19, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/french/news f/spmm f/spmm84 f.htm; Harry G.
Broadman, Russian Trade Policy Reformfor WTO Accession, 401 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS
41, 51-53 (1999); Christian L. Broadbent & Amanda M. McMillian, Russian and the World Trade
Organization: Will TRIPS Be a Stumbling Block to Accession?, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519
(1998).
191. The TRIPS Agreement, in concordance with the general WTO regime, prohibits intellectual
property laws from offering any benefits to local citizens which are not available to citizens of other
TRIPS signatories.
192. See David E. Miller, Combating Copyright Infringement in Russia: A Comprehensive
Approach for Western Plaintiffs, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1203, 1220-22 (2000).
193. Id. at 1207 12.
194. Hearing to Explore Permanent Normal Trade Relations for Russia: Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 48 (2002)
(statement of Thomas R. Pickering, Senior Vice President, International Relations, Boeing).
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A common sentiment among Western observers in the early to mid-
2000s was that among the world leaders in global music piracy, Russia
had one of the largest piracy problems in the world because of inadequate
laws and enforcement mechanisms. 95 Despite a computer-literacy and
population growth rate that was a fraction of China's, the Russian threat
was perceived as equaling, if not exceeding, China's. This was partly due
to China's earlier adoption of IP regulations (China joined the WTO in
2001), but may also have reflected Cold War-era mistrust and
apprehension. Rhetoric from American industry groups like the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) and political leaders bears this
out. In 2005, for instance, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) stated that, before
he would vote on Russia's accession to the WTO, "many of us will have to
be convinced that the Russian government is serious about cracking down
on theft of U.S. intellectual property."' 96 In addition to copyright claims,
the United States contended that Russian law does not provide TRIPS-
consistent protection against unfair commercial use of test data and other
data submitted to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical products. 197  The 2006 annual U.S. Trade
Representative "Section 301" report, for instance, refers to deficiencies
which include: the "lack of an effective and deterrent criminal
enforcement system ... ; the lack of effective plant inspection [for optical
media production and distribution] . . . ; the lack of civil ex parte search
procedures; an extremely porous border; delays in criminal prosecutions
and adjudications; and infrequent destruction of seized pirate goods." 198
To overcome this impasse, in November 2006, United States and
Russia signed a "market access agreement" requiring Russia to take action
to address piracy and make continuing law reforms before the Unites
States would consent to Russia joining the WTO.199 In a side letter to the
market access agreement, the United States singled out Russian optical
195. Michael Mertens, Thieves in Cyberspace: Examining Music Piracy and Copyright Law
Deficiencies in Russia as it Enters the Digital Age, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 139, 143
(2006); see also Russia loses WTO bid as G8 begins, 16 July, 2006, available at http://news.bbc
.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5183892.stm (describing Bush-Putin talks prior to G8 summit relating to
enforcement of Russian laws against the piracy of American music, computer programs, and DVDs).
196. Bradley S. Butterfield, Kevin J. Mason, Joseph B. Payne, and Robert R. Trumble, Human
Resources and Intellectual Property in a Global Outsourcing Environment: Focus on China, India,
and Eastern Europe, 15 INT'L H.R. J. 7 (2006).
197. 2005 OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SPECIAL 301 REPORT.
198. Id. at 32; Laurence R. Helfer, The Neuw Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. I n.218 (2008).
199. Susan Butler, US. Labels Target Russian Music Site, BILLBOARD, Jan. 27, 2007, at 17;
OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FACT SHEET, RESULTS OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON
RUSSIA'S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Nov. 19, 2006).
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media (CD, DVD, etc.) factories and Internet servers that manufactured or
distributed foreign copyrighted works, calling on the Russian government
to aggressively target these offenders.2 °° In exchange for Russia's
agreement to step up enforcement and to streamline the passage of Part IV
of the Civil Code, the United States promised to provide further training
and advisory support for the Russian Ministry of Economic Development
and Trade.2°'
Notwithstanding the market access agreement and assurances from
Russian leaders, losses from IP infringement originating in Russia
continue to rise. An annual report compiled by the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative pursuant to Section 182 of the U.S. Trade Act of
1974 provides a glimpse into the alleged losses from copyright
202infringement in countries like Russia. In 2009 alone, the estimated
losses from Russian piracy of business software were nearly $1.9
203billion. In sum, the American copyright industry estimates that it loses
at minimum $2.5 billion dollars to Russian piracy each year. These figures
do not include estimates for losses of records and music, motion pictures,
entertainment software, and books. Consequently, the U.S. Trade
Representative maintains Russia on its "Priority Watch List." By
comparison, losses due to Chinese piracy (with its significantly larger
population and computer and internet access rates) amount to $3.5
billion.20 4
200. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. RUSSIA BILATERAL MARKET ACCESS
AGREEMENTISIDE LETTER ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Nov. 19, 2006), available at
http://ustraderep.gov/assets/World Regions/EuropeMiddleEast/Russia the NIS/asset upload filel
48 10011.pdf; Bilateral Market Access Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, U.S.-Russia,
available at http:/ustraderep.gov/Trade Sectors/Intellectual Property/Russia/Section lndex.html.
201. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. RUSSIA BILATERAL MARKET ACCESS
AGREEMENTISIDE LETTER ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Nov. 19, 2006).
202. The "Special 301" Report is an annual review of the global state of intellectual property
rights (IPR) protection and enforcement, conducted by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (enacted in 1994).
See 19 U.S.C § 2101 (2006).
203. These statistics are compiled by the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) and
incorporated into the Special 301 Report. See IIPA, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 126 (2010), http://www.iipa
.com/rbc/2010/2010SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf. By comparison, the 2008 losses from Russian piracy of
business software were nearly $2.3 billion. Id. Globally, annual American losses due to IP violations
amount to more than $100 billion, according to one U.S. trade group, the Coalition Against
Counterfeiting and Piracy (headed by NBC VP Rick Cotton). See Darrell A. Hughes, NBC VP: US
Needs Intellectual-Property Rights Protection Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2010, available at http:/
online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100218-714295.html.
204. Id.
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2. Russian Civil Code (Part IV) and Legal Licenses
The following section outlines several substantive provisions relating
to legal licenses and fair use, and compares them with established
American fair use standards to determine the extent of likely actual
harmonization. The U.S. copyright law and fair use exemption are chosen
as a functional equivalent 2 5 because of the vast number of American cases
interpreting and applying the fair use doctrine and the dominance of the
U.S. approach in international IP regulation regimes. Copyright
infringement claims in Russia and the United States also often arise from
similar factual circumstances, especially in cases involving copyright
infringement on the Internet.
To begin, Article 1245 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (all
subsequent article references are to the New Copyright Law) governs the
reproduction of copyrighted works in the form of "home copies"-limited
copies of copyrighted musical works for private use. Even "home"
reproduction of such musical works must be compensated. As before,
copyrighted musical works are protected more strictly than other
audiovisual electronic works, notwithstanding the fact that, currently,
more and more books, academic materials, and other works containing
scientific, artistic, photographic, or other non-musical works take the form
of electronic, easily reproducible works. The distinction between musical
and other audiovisual electronic works made in Article 1245 illustrates the
ambiguity of the current scheme. Thus, the traditionally protected right to
"home copy" musical works for personal archive needs is eliminated,
while home reproduction of non-phonographic or non-musical works is
allowed. Such ambiguities abound in the new law.
For instance, Article 1266 protects authors' rights to prohibit
206alterations of their works. Pursuant to this law, the author's written
permission is required to make any additions, alterations, deletions,
provision of illustrations, to issue a preface, postscript, or add comments
or explanations to a text. In short, all alterations of a work are prohibited
without the author's express consent, save the separately preserved right
for parodies and caricatures. Article 1266 marks a strong departure from
the previous right against alteration. Currently, the author's right to his or
her "reputation" is invoked solely in instances where the alterations may
have caused an infringement on the author's reputation or honor.
205. See Graziadei, supra note 4.
206. These rights are properly titled the rights of inviolability over a given copyrighted work
(npaBa Ha HenpHKOCHOBeHHOCTb HpOH3BejeHHM1).
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Similarly, Article 1273 provides for a limited "private use" exemption.
Pursuant to this Article, reenactment of a copyrighted work is permitted so
long as it is strictly performed for private use.20  However, like Article
1245 (Right to "Home Copy"), the private use exemption is ambiguous on
its face. Applied to the Internet context, the implications of this provision
become even more unclear. First, the term "reenactment"
(Bocnpoii3Begeuiie) does not clearly define a particular set of permissible
rights or acts. Secondly, "private use" is notoriously fuzzy when applied to
the Internet. For instance, is posting a clip of copyrighted music on a
private Internet message board so that the individual can enjoy clips of the
music remotely considered private use, or is the fact that the music clip is
reproduced and hosted on a remote server sufficient to constitute illegal
reproduction?
Article 1274 contains a limited "cultural use" exemption. 20 8 This
section provides a legal license for free use of copyrighted material in
"informational," scientific, educational, or cultural contexts. Although the
educational and cultural exemption seems broad, the exemption itself is
subject to several very broad limitations. For instance, pursuant to Article
1274 Section 2, libraries may lend electronic versions of copyrighted
works (CDs, DVDs, VCR cassettes, e-books) only so long as the works
are viewed in library facilities, under conditions making reproduction
impossible. Immediately, such a limitation bans legitimate
207. See CTaTbg 1273 (CBo60,HOe BOCnPOH3BeeHue npoU3BejHmi B J]HqHb]X LleJItX
,ronycKaeTcH 6e3 co[JlacH~t aBTopa im IHOFO HpaBoo6iajaTeq [ 6e3 BbHljlaTbi BO3HaFpa)IeHHt
BOCrIPOn3Bejenne rpaKIannnoM HCKJiLOqHTeJiHo B IqHbIX UeJIAIX.) [Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [GKRF] [Civil Code] art. 1274 (Russ.) (allowing the free right of reproduction for private
use without the permission of the author or the holder of author's rights and without compensation.)].
208. Id. art. 1274 (allowing the free use of copyrighted works for informational, scientific,
educational/teaching and cultural purposes).
[. ..]
2. B cnyqae, KOFra 6H61noTeKa rlpejocTaBJIxeT 3K3ennIMH1PbI Hpon3BexeHH, npaBoMepHo
BBealeHHbie B FpaxicaHCKH o6opOT, BO BpeMeHHOe 6e3BO3Me3,iHOe nOJlb3OBaHHe, TaKoe
HOJI1b3OBaHne RionycKaeTcA 6e3 coFjiacnIA aBTopa illi HHOFO rlpaBoo6iajaTei H1 6e3
Bb.IaTbI Bo3Harpa)K~reHm. Hp" 3TOM Ubipa)KeHH61e B LI4HdpOBOHi (bopue 3K3eMHJHPbl
npoH3Be, eH H, npeJrocTaBnloeM6be H iOTeKaM H BO BpeMeHHOe 6e3BO3Me3,,Hoe
HoJlb30BaHne, B TOM qHCJ1e B HOPAIRKe B3aHMHOFO HCfIOJIb3OBaHH5I 6H6 JiOTeqHbIX pecypcoB,
MOFYT npeJoCTaBJ19TbCM TOJ1bKO B noMeeH "Mx 6H6JIOTeK npi YCJIOBHH [CKJ[IoqeHHHI
BO3MO)KHOCTII CO3,JaTb KOnI 3THX npoH3BemeHHH B lulHppOBOA (bopMe.
[2. When a library offers samples of works that have been legally introduced into public use,
for temporary non-profit use, this use is allowed without the consent of the author, the holder
of the author's rights, and without compensation. Electronic copies of works, including works
introduced for reciprocal use of resources, may be lended only in the library facilities and
under conditions prohibiting the possibility of creation [reproduction] of these works in
digital form.]
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educational/cultural uses of films and musical works in the home or
classroom context. Clearly, the limitation on libraries' rights to lend cuts
deeply into the educational and cultural prerogatives of the libraries,
namely the free and reasonable dissemination of knowledge and literary
and cultural works.20 9 Moreover, beyond restricting citizens' longstanding
rights to fair, uncompensated use of copyrighted works via the libraries,
the Article arguably infringes on legitimate, constitutionally-protected
rights to access information, especially of those who are unable to travel or
visit libraries.
Article 1275 echoes the restrictive and outdated spirit of Article 1274.
This Article grants libraries the right to reproduce one copy of a
copyrighted work without compensation for purposes of archiving the
given work. Like Article 1274, Article 1275 Section 2 contains a broad
limitation prohibiting the reproduction or storage of reproduced works via
210
electronic means. In other words, libraries may reproduce works via
facsimile with the aid of any technical devices, so long as the devices do
not yield electronic copies of the works.
To put it mildly, the "one analog copy" rule is a relic of an analog
past.2 ' Moreover, this rule, far from enabling a vibrant multimedia
academic atmosphere, stifles research by reducing legitimate fair
electronic uses to paper reproductions. 2  The practical effect of Articles
209. See Janice T. Pilch, Fair Use and Beyond: The Status of Copyright Limitations and
Exceptions in the Commonwealth of Independent States, 65(6) COLL. RES. LIBR. 468, 468 504 (Nov.
2004) (discussing the evolution of fair use in Russia between the 1995 and 2004 legislation).
210. See CTaTbM 1275 (CBo60JHOe HCnlOJlb3OBaHHe HPOH3BeeHH1 nyTeM penporyUmpoBaHHq)
[Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GKRF] [Civil Code] art. 1275 (Russ.). Free use of works
using reproduction].
[. ..]
2. HoR peipO1JYUHPOBanneM (perIporpaqinqecKHM BocHpon3BeieHneM) HOHHMIaeTcI
()aKCHMHJlbHOe BOCHPOI3BeeHHe i1pO!3BeeH4ig C nlOMOIHbO J]1o0blX TeXHHqeCKHX cpeCTB,
ocyu~eCTBJIieMoe He B UeJIX nH3jaHHA. PeIpO!IyUHpOBaHHe He BKjiIoqaeT BOCIPOH3Be eHHe
npOH3Be7eHHM Him xpaHeHHe e[O KOnHfi B )j]eKTpOHHOfi (B TOM qHce B uH1j)poBo),
OrlTHqeCKOH Hul! HHOH MaWIHHOqHTaeMoH ( opMe, KpoMe cjlyqaeB Co3jaHl1m C HOMOIJHB[O
TeXHHqeCKHX cpejCTB BpeMeHHbIX KOifHH, HIpejHa3HaqeHHbIX Rj15 OCyIIIeCTBJleHHSI
perlpoyUHpoBaHHA.
[2. Reproduction (reprographic reproduction) is understood to mean fascimile reproduction of
a given work with the help of any technical device, aside from the initial production.
Reproduction does not include reproduction or storage of copies in electronic (including
digital), optical or other machine form, except in instances of creation with the aid of
technical devices of temporary copies, for the purpose of reproduction.]
211. Pnina Shachaf and Ellen Rubenstein, A Comparative Analysis of Libraries' Approaches to
Copyright: Israel Russia, and the U.S., 33:1 J. ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 94 (2006).
212. For instance, Article 1275, Section 1, Subsection 2, provides that reproductions of excerpts of
copyrighted works may be made upon request from private citizens, but also for educational/scientific
uses. Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GKRF] [Civil Code] art. 1274 (Russ.). This is a
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1274 and 1275 read together is extremely restrictive. For example, schools
are permitted to reproduce paper excerpts of given texts, but may not
distribute identical excerpts in electronic form to students.
Article 1276 codifies a limited "public domain exemption. '213 Pursuant
to this provision, if an architectural or artistic object is in the public
domain, reproductions may be made of it and distributed via airwaves or
via electronic means. As with the foregoing limited copyright exemptions,
the scope of this exemption in the Internet context remains unclear.
Nevertheless, this provision offers substantive justification for an
expanded conception of free licensed use on the Internet. Thus,
photographs of copyrighted works which are found in public squares may
be broadcast on the Internet. However, it is unclear whether reproductions
of copyrighted works appearing in publicly accessible museums would fall
within this exemption. As will be analyzed below, this positive provision
should be interpreted to allow distribution of works in all public (i.e.,
public squares) and quasi-public (i.e., museums) domains via electronic
means such as the Internet.
3. Russian Legal Licenses v. US. "Fair Use" & Berne Convention
As shown above, the New Copyright Law seeks to bring Russian law
in line with strict international copyright norms. Consistent with the Berne
three-part test, the New Copyright Law provides only the most limited
legal licenses or so called "fair use" exemptions to copyright. The
following section will compare the legal licenses afforded by Russian law
with the right to "fair use" embodied in U.S. copyright law.
The "fair use" exemption to the U.S. Copyright Act is codified in 17§ 214U.S.C. § 107. Section 107 also sets out four factors to be considered in
determining whether or not a particular use is fair:
subtle but drastic departure from the existing law which contains language seemingly allowing entire
works to be reproduced for educational use.
213. CTaTb5I 1276. CBO6O0iHOe HCfiOJIb3OBaHHe HpoH3BeieHnI, iOCTOAIHHO HaxowmerocA B
Mecre, OTKPbITOM VMJilt CBO6OHOFO nocemeH141. [Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GKRF]
[Civil Code] art. 1276 (Russ.) (uncompensated use of likeness of work located in a public place)].
214. "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The U.S. Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976, modified several aspects of
U.S. copyright law to harmonize with the requirements of the Berne Convention (Paris Act, 1971) and
entered into force on March 1, 1989. The Berne Implementation Act granted limited moral rights to
authors of visual works within complex limits, but did not modify the "fair use" regime.
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 215
All four of these factors require a court to look at the specific work at issue
using a fact-based analysis of the copying in light of surrounding
circumstances to determine whether infringement has occurred. 216 As the
U.S. Supreme Court has stated in one of its most recent copyright
decisions:
[T]he "fair use" defense allows the public to use not only facts and
ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in
certain circumstances.... The fair use defense affords considerable
"latitude for scholarship and comment. ,217
The scope of this "considerable latitude" is varied in U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the ambiguity in the scope allows for a wide
range of ostensibly permissible uses, with only the risk of post facto
sanctions for copyright infringement. In other words, rather than providing
a strict positive enactment of permissible uses, the U.S. copyright law
establishes a flexible retroactive "fair use" limitation.2 8 In over 150 years
of common law litigation (prior to codification in 1976), 219 this system has
proven flexible, yet procedurally and substantively fair, by forcing
plaintiffs to guard and enforce their rights.220
215. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
216. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 78 (1994) (stating that "[fair use in
copyright] is not to be simplified with bright-line rules," but rather in "case-by-case analysis" in which
the four factors "are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright"); see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 361-458
(1985).
217. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (emphasis added).
218. See generally Daniel J. Gervais, Towards A New Core International Copyright Norm: The
Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2005).
219. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 was a comprehensive revision of the 1909 Copyright Act. It
became effective on January 1, 1978.
220. Cf David Nimmer, "Fairest of them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003) (describing inconsistency in applying the "fair use" standard).
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There are a number of practical consequences of this "reverse"
approach. First, it gives private individuals and educational or cultural
institutions the right to independently assess their own conduct and
develop unique policies for non-infringement, based on their own
capacities for risk, litigation, etc. Thus, educational bodies such as
universities may interpret the first factor in the "fair use" test-whether
the use is for a commercial purpose or a non-profit educational purpose-
rather broadly (perhaps as a dispositive factor), and opt to provide clearly
copyrighted material to their students under the guise of "fair use.,
221
The Russian legal licenses provided in the New Copyright Law
correspond to the "fair use" standard found in U.S. copyright law. Major
categories of historically protected use are respected in the New Russian
Law. Thus, the major academic rights are adequately protected: the right
to use excerpts of works in an academic setting; the right to create an
archival reproduction of copyrighted works; the right to reproduce works
for "personal use." In the traditional print and durable media context, these
major rights are uncontroversial.
Nevertheless, with respect to emerging technologies, the positive
limited legal license approach seems unworkable on its face. For instance,
one can imagine myriad legitimate educational uses of copyrighted
musical or film works in the home or classroom settings. Accordingly,
many U.S. libraries with flexible interpretations of the "fair use" standard
allow their borrowers to rent copyrighted musical works, videos, DVDs,
and other media in furtherance of their educational and cultural missions.
Of course, other U.S. libraries do not have faith in the purely educational
motives of their patrons and restrict borrowing of these materials out of
fear that the materials are being illegally reproduced.222 The important
point, however, is that these libraries have an independent right to interpret
their patrons' habits and devise policies which they feel adequately
embody true "fair use." In other words, there is a freedom to make new
technologies available, but the freedom imposes on libraries, and their
borrowers, the responsibility to use the technologies in a responsible,
copyright-friendly manner. Depending on their preference for risking
copyright infringement lawsuits, libraries can adapt to completely new
technologies (providing copyrighted works via electronic means to their
221. Indeed, this is the rationale employed by multiple major research universities in the United
States (such as the University of Michigan) for allowing the Google Books project to scan, copy, and
reproduce their entire collections.
222. I draw on my personal experiences with public, private, academic, and general use libraries
in the United States and experiences with libraries in Russia.
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patrons) or opt in favor of tried and true paper book lending models.22 3 As
a result, new technologies are used in innovative and efficient ways,
contributing to broader dissemination of the original copyrighted work in
question.
The new Russian model employs a completely different approach. For
instance, by banning libraries from reproducing works in electronic form,
Articles 1274 and 1275 reduce libraries to traditional book lending
institutions. Not only are these acts unenforceable, but they unnecessarily
inhibit innovation towards the development of more efficient library
models. 24 Likewise, the new acts seem to outlaw existing innovative
technological library projects such as the Open Russian Electronic
Library 25 of the Russian State Library or the digitization efforts started by
226the Russian State Library in 1999 (ADAMANT project). Cases like
ZAO Kommersant, Publishing House v. ZAO Public Library & 000
Vector Info will likely be resolved even more forcefully against private
companies wishing to establish limited public access online libraries. 27
More generally, in the words of one commentator, "fair use is a much
more flexible and adaptable doctrine with respect to new forms of use than
223. For instance, the Cornell University library system (along with several other American Ivy
League universities) currently allows patrons to request portions of copyrighted works to be
electronically imaged and sent to the borrowers via e-mail. This benefit is intended to serve Cornell
scholars residing away from the main Ithaca, NY campus. The borrower of course assumes the duty to
use the work in ways consistent with U.S. copyright laws.
224. LENTA NEWS, Ostankino Court Found Lib.ru in Violation of the Rights of the Writer
Gevorgyan, Mar. 31, 2005, http://lenta.ru/news/2005/03/31 /lib/.
225. OTKbIpTaAI pyccKaA 3JIeKTPOHHa5I 6H6inoTeKa, http://orel.rsl.ru (last visited Oct. 25, 2011)
(previously containing over 8,655 online books); see also National Electronic Library, http://rusnel
.ru/index.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (providing free access to multiple current copyrighted literary
works, e.g., ten of Boris Akunin's stories and plays). It should be noted that in its charter, the National
Electronic Library requires member libraries and contributors to the electronic fund to be copyright
holders or to act pursuant to the Law on Author's Rights and Neighboring Rights. See Charter of
Russian Electronic Library, Section 1.1, Legal Basis, available at http://rusnel.ru/conception.htm.
226. The ADAMANT project was started in 1999 with the goal of digitizing (creating digital
copies) the entire Russian State Library collection, over 40 million works. The ADAMANT project
eventually evolved into the Open Russian Electronic Library and the National Electronic Library. See
Creating an Information System for the Russian State. A pilot project Challenging IT, 66th IFLA
Council and General Conference, http://www.ifla.org/IV/ifla66/papers/056-142e.htm (last visited Oct.
25,2011).
227. V.B. Naumov, LAW AND THE INTERNET: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE 199 205
(University Publishing House 2002). The case involved a private for-profit company that included
copyrighted material in its paid library without the copyright holders' consent. The court applied the
law on libraries to the private company, holding that the company did not have a right to use the
content. The holding rested on several factors: (1) the access to the website was on a subscription or
paid basis; (2) the publication on the Internet differed from traditional library uses in that it was
permanent. A modern case involving similar "embedded" content with a "time-bomb" (file expires
after certain time) would have probably passed the court's scrutiny under the current law. However,
under the New Copyright Law, this act would probably constitute infringement.
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purpose-specific exception, most of which are not technologically
neutral.,,228 This is not to say that the current "fair use" standard in
American law is fully workable or applied consistently with respect to
alleged Internet copyright violations. It is not. The only real advantage of
the "fair use" standard is its relative flexibility. Scholars know that they
may use works "fairly" and act "fairly" according to their own meanings
of what is "fair." One student standing at a Xerox® may copy five pages
of a textbook and deem it fair; another may copy five books and deem it
fair. Depending on the context, both instances may be legitimate fair use.
The key is that it is not necessary to draw bright lines, to impose page
limits on copies, or to restrict the modes of reproduction. Some students or
professors may be caught copying books and be forced to pay
compensation, but most will know they have a reasonable right to copy,
and more importantly, will continue to copy.
However, compared to the relatively flexible "fair use" standard, which
may be litigated following particular alleged copyright violations, the legal
license approach works the opposite way. It seeks to enumerate specific
rights that institutions have, but by doing so ambiguously, it stifles the
institutions' rights to invent and experiment with novel teaching
techniques and new technologies in the classroom, such as multi-media
teaching and playing films in cultural centers.
These problems are not unique to Russia. Nearly two decades of IP
litigation in the United States has not produced a workable "fair use"
standard with respect to the copyright obligations of Internet service
providers, Internet cataloguers, Internet encyclopedias, and so forth.
However, it is perhaps the failure to produce a comprehensive catalog of
Internet rights and liabilities which has contributed to the dramatic growth
of the information technology (IT) sector, and the Internet in particular. As
renowned Internet law expert Lawrence Lessig and others have argued, it
was perhaps a boon to the IT industry and to American culture that many
of the most popular Internet uses remained in legal limbo, or in the gray
shadow of legitimacy in the first decade of the Information Age. 229 Even
today, the most important issues of copyright law, including the scope of
the "fair use" exemption, are being tested and reshaped by Google (e.g.,
Google Books) and numerous other Internet pioneers eager to stake
legitimate legal claims to virgin Internet territory. 230 Despite new
228. See Gervais, supra note 218, at 27.
229. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2006), available at http://www.free-
culture.cc/freecontent/.
230. For instance, the right of search engines to display portions of other websites was extensively
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legislation in the United States such as the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (heightening penalties for copyright infringement on the Internet),
U.S. law remains uncertain with respect to key copyright issues. Not
surprisingly, as the law remains uncertain, innovation continues.
The Russian experience with Internet innovation has been equally if
not more spectacular since the early 1990s, precisely because of a similar
legal uncertainty regarding the status of the Internet. For this reason, sites
like AIIofMP3 sprung onto the international stage, gaining wide following.
Russian Internet use surged and a vibrant and lucrative information
technology sector was able to develop throughout Russia and the former
Soviet Union, including smaller nations like Moldova. Immediately after
its launch in 2000, AllotVP3 became embroiled in domestic lawsuits by
international firms, including the RIAA. The disputes continued
throughout the 2000s. Despite mounting international opposition, the legal
theories being litigated before the local Moscow courts pointed to a
growing appreciation among Russian jurists for American-style
231I
ambivalence in Internet law . Uncertainty in Russian law on non-
contractual licensing also seemed to encourage innovation in the sector
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.232 However, as shown above, in
enacting the New Copyright Law, Russia sought to greatly limit traditional
legal licenses and fair use exceptions, indeed in a far more restrictive
manner than found in U.S. legislation.
Similarly, along with enacting the New Copyright Law, from 2007,
Russia also began an aggressive effort to implement and strictly enforce
the letter of the new law. In June 2007, for instance, the popular file-
sharing site mentioned above, AllofMP3.ru, was shut down due to
pressure from the Russian government. Not coincidentally, the lawsuit by
debated within academic circles in the early years of the Internet, with the courts ultimately ruling that
search engine displays were permissible fair uses. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811
(9th Cir. 2003) (inlined thumbnails in search engine results considered fair use since they did not
undermine the copyright holder's potential market); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (echoing Kelly); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006)
(content cached by search engines' crawlers did not violate fair use principles); see also Danny
Sullivan, Google Book Search Wins Victory in German Challenge, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, June 28,
2006, http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2058383/Google-Book-Search-Wins-Victory-In-German-
Challenge (noting that a German court advised against plaintiffs lawsuit against Google Book Search
based on the theory that Google's display of portions of copyrighted work in Google Book Search
engine was similar to search engines' display of result data).
231. On August 27, 2007, a Moscow district court ruled that AllofMP3.com operated within the
law, http://www.allofmp3.ru/press.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
232. Budylin & Osipova, supra note 176, at 1.
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the RIAA was dropped shortly thereafter.233 Since 2008, the New
Copyright Law has also signaled the start of a new era in Russian Internet
law, more broadly speaking, marked by increasingly detailed positive laws
relating to property rights in non-traditional network media, Internet, and
over products of intellectual activity concerning the Internet. Aside from
an expected decrease in experimentation and innovation by information
technology firms due to exposure to litigation risk, this new era is also
marked by greater cooperation between Russia and Western firms in
defense of these rights.
The forecast for the immediate future of copyright in Russian Internet
law seems filled with challenges. With the enactment of the New
Copyright Law, Russia seems poised to take on an ambitious range of
enforcement measures aimed at "cleaning up" its Internet piracy problem,
as well as its image with respect to copyright enforcement before the
international community. The end result promises to be harmonization
between Russian, EU, and broader international copyright law, all aimed
at supporting Russia's accession to the WTO.234
The more important question at this point is whether Russia will need
to further amend its New Copyright Law to conform to WTO standards?
At present, it is doubtful that further law reform will be necessary, as the
current law seems to codify the existing Berne three-step test 235 and is
likely to be strictly applied in practice.236 Thus far, the scope of this three-
part test has not been delimited on the international plane, and application
of the test has produced only general guidelines.237 Furthermore, Russia
233. Music Industry Drops Copyright Suit Against Russian Music Site, ALLFMP3 BLOGS (May
26, 2008, 12:35 PM), http://blogs.allofmnp3.ru/music-news/2008/05/26/music-industry-drops-copyright-
suit-against-russian-music-site/.
234. Cameron, supra note 190.
235. The Berne three-step test is a clause that has been included in several international treaties on
copyright (notably the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the EU Copyright Directive,
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty). It imposes constraints on the possible
limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights under national copyright laws. The most important
version of the test is that included in Article 13 of TRIPS. It reads: "Members shall confine limitations
and exceptions to exclusive rights to [1] certain special cases which; [2] do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work; and [3] do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights
holder." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 175, art. 13.
236. Research has not produced a sufficient number of Russian cases interpreting the New
Copyright Law. Therefore, the analysis regarding likely application in practice is based on firsthand
empirical research and discussions with Russian IP attorneys and scholars.
237. See Gervais, supra note 218, at 14-19 (analyzing application of three-part test to US
Copyright Act by 2001 WTO panel).
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has recently acceded to the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") Internet Treaties.238
One can expect that in the near term Russia will seek to further restrict
fair use exemptions, particularly in the Internet context. To promote
enforcement, Russia may even experiment with new anti-piracy measures
such as Internet trolls, restrictive firewalls, and similar measures currently
used and being developed by governments like China to restrict Internet
access. With a large, highly sophisticated pool of information technology
specialists, Russia is particularly well-equipped to experiment with
disastrous Internet monitoring measures under the guise of copyright
enforcement. The threat of such measures for media and particularly
Internet freedom in Russia cannot be understated, especially in light of
Russia's historical experience with state censorship and restrictions on the
flow of information.
In sum, the New Copyright Law accomplishes exactly what its writers
set out to do-it marks a complete break with the legacy of Soviet
copyright policy that remained in the 1993 Law on Author's Rights (such
as the broad academic/cultural use exemption) and harmonizes Russian
law with existing international copyright norms. As has been argued
elsewhere, 39 instead of developing workable parameters for copyright
exceptions for the Internet, or invoking new technologies that mitigate the
threats against copyrights, or drawing a flexible line between copyrights
and exceptions, 4 ° the New Copyright Law can have the unintended
consequence of chilling the exercise of free speech. As a result of the strict
New Copyright Law and out of fear of litigation, companies,
organizations, and individuals may be less likely to exercise their
constitutionally protected speech and access to information rights not only
in the Internet context, but also more generally. Subsequent waves of IP
law reform in Russia will most likely attempt to delineate these previously
ambiguous rights.
238. The WIPO Internet Treaties refers to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The WCT and the WPPT entered into force on March
6, 2002, and May 20, 2002, respectively. See World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO
INTERNET TREATIES, available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/ecommerce/450/wipopub
1450in.pdf.
239. Conference Presentation at Moscow State University, Faculty of Journalism: "Fair Use" In
Russia's New Internet Regulation Regime A Law and Economics Perspective, Mass Information in
Internet: Freedom and Responsibility (Oct. 12-13, 2007).
240. For instance, Digital Rights Management, or legal recognition of viable read-only
alternatives to text versions of e-books (i.e., non-printable, non-copyable Adobe .pdf files such as
AHTOH Cepro, HHTEPHET H HPABO (2002), available at http://intemet-law.ru/book/text/book 5.pdf).
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But as concerns us here, the domestic IP sector reforms are also
symptomatic of several broader developments in Russian international
legal theory. First, just as in the Interwar period, the post-Soviet reforms
signify a general willingness to conform to customary and evolving
international norms. From the standpoint of Russian international lawyers,
the domestic implementation of international norms aimed at delineating
and defending private property rights seems to constitute a core function
of public international law. As in the Interwar period, post-Soviet
international jurists are fully aware that state relations are no longer
confined to matters of war and peace, but increasingly encompass
commercial concerns. In Russia, economic practices and firm activity are
perceived as having an impact on Russia's image as a responsible
economic actor. The image of a predictable economic actor is also
bolstered by actions which demonstrate predictable state action, and vice
versa. This means that, for now, Russia will continue its efforts to
strengthen its IP regime, especially in high-profile copyright infringement
cases.
C. Policy Trade-Offs, Resistance, Values, and Interests
The historical outline provided above suggests several normative
lessons. First, and most significant, the WTO's continued opposition to
Russia's accession has had the effect of forcing Russia to explore
alternative economic integration arrangements, often along lines
resembling the previous Soviet economic union.241 Russia's surprise
announcement in July 2009 that it intended to accede to the WTO as a
regional customs body along with Kazakhstan and Belarus (instead of as a
state party) sent ripples of discontent in the international trade community.
However, this resistance was to be expected. Russian international law
discourse has been voicing discontent regarding the WTO accession
process for at least the last five years.242 Leading Russian jurists involved
241. HIROSHI ODA, RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL LAW (2d rev. ed., Nijhoff 2007).
242. F.M. BEJBM3MHHOB, ME)K)JYHAPOHOE DKOHOMWIECKOE FIPABO H HPOIIECC § 588
(BO.Tepc K.lyBep, 2004) ("COOTBeTCTByLuHi 1,O0FOBOPHO CKpeHJ1eHHb61 CHH,3pOM
6e3OTBeTCTBeHHOCT iTaeT oTqacTH, Hapl)AIy c HpOqHMH MOTHBaMH, H aMepHKaHCKOe
coripOTHBJIeHHe l)opmaarlHO RaBHO Ha3peBHemy HpHegy POCCHH B BTO, H60 B paMKaX 31o
opraH3am H npuaeTcM OTKa3aTbCM O ,HuCKpHMHHaLmmOHHOA 6e3OTBeTCTBeHHOCT" nepej PoccHen.")
[G.M. VELYAMINOV, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND PROCEDURE § 588 (WaltersKluwer,
2004) ("The corresponding and contractually binding syndrome of irresponsibility [regarding the U.S.-
Russian bilateral agreement absolving U.S. firms of liability in Russia] partially feeds into, along with
other motives, the American opposition to Russia's accession to the WTO, which is formally long
overdue. As a result, Russia will likely be forced to withdraw from the discriminatory treatment [of the
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in the IP harmonization efforts, like Victor A. Dozortsev, genuinely hoped
that their efforts would be rewarded with WTO accession and were
surprised, if not outright offended,243 when the United States continued to
stall Russia's integration efforts. 44 For its part, the American lobby has
raised legitimate concerns regarding the implementation of the New
Copyright Law and related legislative enactments. Yet there is a palpable
indignation among certain Russian jurists at the treatment Russian good-
faith efforts have received in the U.S. For instance, American demands
that copyright violations be governed by criminal, rather than civil law,
and that software programs carry copyright protection rather than patent
protection, were extensively debated in the Russian working group, but
ultimately rejected on policy grounds, such as the fact that no Western
European state afforded such protections. 45
WTO].")]. Velyaminov, a professor of law and a chief researcher at the ISL, is one of Russia's leading
experts on international economic and trade law.
243. AeKcaHp JI. MaKOBCK1fl, Aviepuwcaucxa2q Hcmopu2, 7(1) BECTHHK FPACAQAHCKOFO
FJPABA 165 96 (2007) [Alexander L. Makovsky, American History, 7(1) VESTNIK GRAZHDANSKOGO
PRAVA 165-96 (2007)] (discussing the involvement of individual U.S. Senators during the
development of Part IV, and personal dissatisfaction with their conduct); see Letter from Chuck E.
Grassley & Max Baucus, U.S. Senators, to Peter F. Allgeier, Acting United States Trade
Representative (Apr. 11, 2005) (on file with author), reproduced at http://finance.senate.gov/
newsroom/ranking/release/?id-ef71e567-f685-4b37-9203-2d56fca0e86a (letter concerning U.S.
reservations about Russia's accession to WTO due to IP infringement). Alexander L. Makovsky (b.
1930) is one of the leading civil law jurists in Russia and a renowned authority on intellectual property
law. He was the deputy chair of the working group that developed Part IV. See also AJIEKCAHJIP A1.
MAKOBCKHTI, 0 KOAHsHKAI4ImH FPAI AAHCKOFO HPABA (1922 2006) (M: CTaTyT, 2009) [Alexander
L. Makovsky, On the Codification of Civil Law (1922-2006) (Moscow: Statute 2009)]; A.A.
MaKOBcKHfl, 06pauqetue K qumameno, BECTHI4K FPAKAAHCKOFO HPABA ("C03,aHHe HOBOFO
pOCCHIfCKoFO Fpa) RJaHCKOFO 3aKOHOaTe.IbCTBa eIe He 3aBepileHo. )JayleKo He Bce B yXce IpH,HTbIX H
,AefiCTByOIUIHX 3aKonax ce6 onpa jai o--3TO H MHOFHe <<aMep1lKaH13Mbi ) B KOpHOpaTHBHOM ipaBe H
HOpMaTHBHbiX aKTaX O HHBecTHLIHOHHbiX [teHHbiX 6yMavax, H KpafiHe HpOTHBOpeqHBOe
3aKOHOIaTeJ1bCTBO 0 HeKOMMep q eCKHX opFaHH3aIJHsIx, H MHOFOe jipyFoe. PAR21 KpyHHbIX 3aKOHOB
Hy)KIaeTCI B HpoyMaHHOM CoBepweIeHCTBOBaHHH. He slBJIleTCst B )TOM OTHOIHeHHH HCKJIHOqeHHeM H
FpaKIaHCKHfi KoxeKc.") [Alexander L. Makovsky, Appeal to the Reader, VESTNIK GRAZHDANSKOGO
PRAVA, available at http://www.mvgp.ru/full obr/ ("The creation of a new Russian civil code is not
yet complete. By far not all of the adopted and active laws were vindicated [by history]-along with a
number of "Americanisms" in corporate law and normative acts on investments and negotiable
instruments, and contradictory legislation on NGOs, and much else. A series of maior laws is in need
of measured reevaluation, not excluding the civil code.")].
244. See generally BHKTOP A. 103OPIIEB, HHTEJIlEKTYAJIbHBIE FIPABA: HOHSTHE, CHCTEMA,
3AAqH KOJEIHHKAAHI4 (CbOPHHK CTATEfi) (M.: CTaTyT, 2005) [VICTOR A. DOZORTSEV,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CONCEPTION, SYSTEM AND PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION (COLLECTED
ARTICLES) (Moscow: Statute 2005)]. Dozortsev (1928-2003) was one of the leading Russian jurists in
the working group developing Part IV of the Civil Code.
245. Pleshanova, supra note 186. U.S. copyright law also provides mainly civil remedies, though
the U.S. government may file criminal charges for any violation of the Copyright Act provided that
such infringement is undertaken "willfully" and "for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain." 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006). However, the United States has moved more aggressively
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Second, U.S. insistence on further law reform-even after the passage
of Part IV of the Civil Code-seems unlikely to resonate due to the U.S.'s
failure to deliver on its promises (most significantly, dropping opposition
to WTO accession). For instance, in its 2009 "Section 301" report, the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative "look[ed] to Russia to make
further progress by ensuring that the Russian Customs Code, Civil Code
and Law on Medicines comply with the Intellectual Property Rights
('IPR') Bilateral Agreement and the relevant TRIPS Agreement
obligations that will take effect upon Russia's accession to the WTO. 246
While these recommendations are certainly warranted, they are
increasingly perceived by Russian elites as disingenuous.
In contrast to the United States, the EU has been consistently in favor
of Russian accession, notwithstanding Russia's evolving IP regime.247
This may be reflected in the EU's own complex process of standardization
in the realm of IP throughout the 1990s. 248 The underlying rationale
behind EU standardization in the IP domain is similar to any
harmonization project.
The underlying philosophy of standardization, to put ideas into the
public domain, and the philosophy of intellectual property rights, to
maintain ideas or expression as private properties, are inconsistent
and that tensions between them could inhibit the rapid adoption of
EU standards.249
However, the EU proceeded with the understanding that actual de facto
harmonization could only occur as the result of actual trade, contestation,
and revision over a prolonged period of time following WTO accession.250
towards criminalizing copyright infringement, particularly to fight piracy over the Internet. See, e.g.,
No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Star. 2678 (1997).
246. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 16 (2009), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full / 20Version / 20of 2Othe%/ 202009%/ 20SPECIAL / 2030I
%20REPORT.pdf
247. For EU-Russia trade issues related to Russia's accession to the WTO, see Rafael Leal-Arcas,
The European Union and New Leading Powers: Towards Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas,
32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 345 (2006); Despite Obstacles, EU Expects Russia to Join WTO This Year, 12
INTL CENTRE FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 23 (2008), available at http:/
ictsd.org/i/news/bridgeweekly/12267/.
248. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, RONALD S. LAURIE & LAWRENCE E. ELDER, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN EUROPE 12.5 (Prentice Hall
Law & Business 1992).
249. Id. (citing European Commission, Communication on the Development of European
Standardization Action for Faster Technological Integration in Europe, COM (90) 456 final, 1991
(C 20) 1 [Green Paper], at 25).
250. See Backer, supra note 159, at 3-17 (suggesting that harmonization and convergence is
primarily the result of, and in furtherance of, economic activity).
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The EU's position on Russian intellectual property reform is informed by
this pragmatic experience, and is borne out by the harmonization reforms
in former socialist countries that have since joined the EU. The principal
lesson of EU harmonization in the IP domain was that even as states adopt
formal European Community directives, emerging technologies will
continue to challenge traditional IP forms.25" '
Third, while there is a dissenting isolationist strain in Russian foreign
policy discourse,252 Russian leaders and elites are fully committed to the
view that globalization is a good thing, and that further integration into the
global trading regime is in Russia's long term interests. This thinking has
been entirely consistent with the historical development of international
law in the West 253 and in Russia since the collapse of communism. The
notion that individuals and firms have universal fundamental economic
rights that transcend the wills of national rulers has strong resonance in
contemporary Russia. As seen above, even during the early and later
Soviet periods, the USSR subordinated its ideological rhetoric to more
concrete economic realities. At the same time, Russian leaders are
noticeably sensitive to what they perceive as American international trade
gamesmanship, egoism, 254 and imposition.255 Under Putin, Russia has
closed nearly all outstanding international aid projects and reform
256initiatives. Furthermore, Russia has also started to reassess its reliance
251. See Peter Smulders, The European Union and Copyright § 4(2), in INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Paul Edward Geller ed., 2009).
252. BaauM lbiM6ypcKHA, Ocmpo6 PoccuR, PYccKfi4 APXHYTEJTAF (2002) [Vadim Tsimburgskii,
The Island of Russia, RUSSIAN ARCHIPELAGO (2002)], available at http://archipelag.ru/ru mir/ostrov-
rus/cymbur/island russia.
253. BErN STEIL, MANUEL HINDS, MONEY, MARKETS & SOVEREIGNTY 11 (2009).
254. Bureau Report, US Can Never Regain Its Status in Global Market: Putin, ZEENEWS, Oct. 9,
2008, (on file with author); see also VINCENT BARNETT, A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN ECONOMIC
THOUGHT ix (Routledge 2005) (explaining Western economists' view of Russian counterparts as
"inferior").
255. KATHERINE VERDERY, WHAT WAS SOCIALISM, AND WHAT COMES NEXT? 3 16 (1996)
(discussing the perception of the transferring of Western institutions, such as markets and democracy,
to non-Western settings).
256. World Bank Proiect No. P008831 (Russian Legal Reform Project) (June 13, 1996 to
December 31, 2005), http://web.worldbank.org/external/proiects/main?pagePK-64283627&piPK-
73230&theSitePK-40941&menuPK-228424&contentFed-yes&Projectid-P008831; see also World
Bank Report No. T-6883-RU, Appendix G (setting forth priority substantive areas of law such as
international trade and property law). The proiect was administered by the Russian Foundation for
Legal Reform ("RFLR"), a governmental non-profit organization founded in April 1996 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No.81 of February 2, 1996. The founders were the Administration of the President
of Russian Federation, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Commission on
Securities and Stock Market of RE Federal Government, and the Russian Academy of Science. The
EU also participated in Russian law reform from December 1997 to March 2001. See, e.g.,
Strengthening the State of Law and Legal Education Under New Market Relations, Tacis Project
EDRUS 9607. Smaller mainly European-funded law reform research projects continued in Russia
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on Western economic models in the wake of the financial crisis, although
257
what tangible changes will result remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Despite ascribing to a communist ideology and professing an
exceptional "socialist international law" in the domain of international
intellectual property law (specifically, copyright law), the Soviet Union
has consistently worked to harmonize its domestic law with general
developments in international law. This has been done to facilitate trade in
material and intellectual property with Western powers. Soviet
international law scholars reconciled legal harmonization with communist
principles by employing a number of novel rhetorical and argumentative
structures, such as: (1) the transition theory to justify temporary
concessions and compromises; (2) international legal instrumentalism to
justify the ends over the means; and (3) de-politicization of substantive
international law matters to make intellectual property protection a matter
of administrative international law, and hence not subject to theoretical
contestation with the West.
Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has implemented at least four
major law reform projects in the IP domain (1993, 1994, 2004, 2008) to
further harmonize domestic law with emerging international norms. The
latest round of reforms is intended to be a definitive domestic codification
of Russia's outstanding international obligations in the realm of
intellectual property. In anticipation of, and in furtherance of, WTO
accession, Russia has harmonized its domestic legislation with all
outstanding TRIPS obligations, including the WIPO Internet Treaties.
Comparative analysis of Russian copyright law with U.S. "fair use"
standards reveals Russian copyright law to be at least as stringent as its
U.S. counterpart.
The WTO's continued refusal to permit Russian accession is based, in
part, on Russia's lax enforcement of IP protections. Considering that
Russia has coordinated its formal domestic legislation with international
through 2008, such as that administered by the Dutch Center for International Legal Cooperation. See
DUTCH CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COOPERATION, ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2007), available at
http://www.cilc.nl/annualreport2007.pdf (three-year Matra-funded proiect to assist the harmonization
of Russian civil and administrative procedure law ended in July 2008).
257. Robert Jellinek, Russia and the Global Meltdown: Domestic and Foreign Policy Responses
to the International Financial Crisis 33, CARNEGIE CENTER, available at http:/camegieendowment
.org/files/I 1972Jellinek.pdf. Jellinek's analysis of Russia's response offers an excellent introduction to
Russia's measures in the wake of the crisis.
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norms, it is unclear how long Russia must wait to demonstrate acceptable
levels of enforcement. This ambiguous position has generated resentment
among leading Russian policy-makers and jurists. This is likely to hinder
future reform projects, spawn further resistance to WTO-mandated
reforms, and interrupt the organic legal harmonization efforts underway in
Russia.
